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A B ST R ACT. The Supreme Court has described the Indian Commerce Clause as the primary
constitutional basis for federal exclusive and plenary power over Indian affairs. Recently, Justice
Clarence Thomas, citing current scholarship, has argued that the Clause's original understand-
ing does not support this authority, with radical implications for current doctrine.
This Article uses unexamined historical sources to question this debate's fundamental
premise. It argues that the Indian Commerce Clause, open-ended when written, was a minor
component of eighteenth-century constitutional thought. This Article instead posits alternate
sources for federal authority over Indian affairs, drawing particularly on the Washington Admin-
istration. Asserting federal power against the states, the Administration embraced a holistic con-
stitutional reading akin to present-day field preemption. With respect to authority over Indians,
the Administration, through law-of-nations interpretations, asserted ultimate U.S. sovereignty
over tribes, while acknowledging Native autonomy beyond these limitations. Yet these suppos-
edly narrow legal principles ultimately formed the basis for the later elaboration of plenary pow-
er over tribes.
On the one hand, this history provides a more solid foundation for doctrinal principles
derided as incoherent. On the other hand, it suggests more cabined federal authority over Indi-
ans. Ultimately, the Article demonstrates the value of more historically grounded reconstructions
of constitutional understandings.
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INTRODUCTION
"Federal Indian policy is, to say the least, schizophrenic."
-Justice Clarence Thomas
"You talk of the law of nature and the law of nations, and they are both
against you. "
- Onitositah (Corn Tassel), Cherokee chief
For over a century, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to
grant the federal government "plenary" power over "Indian Affairs" -the dip-
lomatic, political, military, and commercial relationships between the United
States and Native nations.3 Plenary power, as used by the Court, has two dis-
tinct meanings. 4 Sometimes the Court uses the term interchangeably with "ex-
clusive," to describe federal power over Indian affairs to the exclusion of states.
But the Court also uses the term to describe the doctrine that the federal gov-
ernment has unchecked authority over Indian tribes, including their internal
affairs. The Court has ruled that federal plenary power authorizes the govern-
ment to take Native land without compensation,' for instance, or to expand,
contract, or even abolish tribal sovereignty at will.
6
While gesturing to other constitutional provisions,7 the Court has largely
relied on the Indian Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the authority
"[t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes," 8 to justify the federal
government's exclusive power against states and plenary power over tribes.
"[T]he Indian Commerce Clause makes 'Indian relations . . . the exclusive
i. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
2. Tatham's Characters Among the North American Indians, 7 TENN. HIST. MAG. 174, 177 (Sam'l
C. Williams ed., 1921).
3. In this Article, I favor the term "Native," but occasionally employ "Indian," particularly
when used as a term of art, to describe the indigenous peoples of North America. I also place
words such as "Founder" and "Founding" in quotes. Though these terms are standard in le-
gal scholarship, in my view they connote too much identification between present and past
and provide little clarity about an individual's particular historical role.
4. To avoid confusion between these two meanings, I use the term "exclusive" to refer to fed-
eral power over Indian affairs in exclusion of the states, and reserve "plenary" to refer to fed-
eral power over Native nations. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.o2[]
(Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012).
5. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 290-91 (1955).
6. Lara, 541 U.S. at 199-203.
7. In Lara, for instance, the majority briefly mentioned the Treaty Clause, as well as preconsti-
tutional authority, as possible sources of federal plenary power. Id. at 200-01.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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province of federal law,"' 9 the Court opined in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flori-
da, precluding the exercise of "virtually all" state authority.1" As for the extent
of federal power over Indian tribes, "the central function of the Indian Com-
merce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field
of Indian affairs," the Court stated in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico. 1
Both the exclusive and plenary power doctrines rest on unstable founda-
tions. When the Court first enunciated the plenary power doctrine in 1886, it
considered, and rejected, the Indian Commerce Clause as the doctrine's
source.'2 Since then, many scholars have questioned whether the Clause could
be read to grant the federal government unbridled power to regulate tribes' in-
ternal affairs.'3 More recently, a revisionist strand of originalist scholarship has
challenged the long-received wisdom that the Clause grants the federal gov-
ernment authority to the exclusion of the states, arguing that the Clause's orig-
inal understanding supports a far narrower scope for federal power and a
broader role for the states. 4
The Court, however, has shied away from reexamining these doctrinal ba-
ses for nearly all federal Indian law- until recently. In two recent concurrences,
Justice Clarence Thomas has subjected the Court's Indian Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to a wide-ranging originalist critique. In United States v. Lara, he
questioned whether inherent tribal sovereignty and congressional plenary
power can coexist."5 And in the 2013 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl decision, Jus-
9. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 60 (1996) (quoting Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indi-
an Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985)).
1o. Id. at 62.
%i. Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
12. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886) ("[W]e think it would be a very
strained construction of this clause, that a system of criminal laws for Indians ... without
any reference to their relation to any kind of commerce, was authorized by the grant of pow-
er to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.").
13. Some of the many works questioning federal plenary power's constitutionality include T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONsTITUION, THE STATE,
AND AMERiCAN CITIZENSHIP 124-25 (2002); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 113, 115-16, 133 (2002); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticat-
ing Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 31, 55-56 (1996); and Mark Savage, Native Ameri-
cans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57, 79 (1991).
14. Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENY. U.
L. REV. 201, 241-44, 250 (2007); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL
L. REV. lO69, 1o89 (2004); cf. Nathan Speed, Note, Examining the Interstate Commerce Clause
Through the Lens of the Indian Commerce Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 467, 472-78 (2007) (arguing
for a narrow reading of the Commerce Clause, given early Congresses' narrow legislation
under the Clause). Natelson and Prakash also question federal plenary power over Indian
tribes. Natelson, supra, at 243-44, 247-48; Prakash, supra, at lO87-90.
15. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214-15, 224-25 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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tice Thomas challenged congressional authority to enact the statute at issue,
the Indian Child Welfare Act.16 Drawing on the revisionist originalist scholar-
ship, Justice Thomas argued that the Indian Commerce Clause provides federal
authority only over Indian trade, narrowly defined. 7
Justice Thomas's critique of the Court's Indian Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence has radical and largely unexplored implications,s and deserves to be tak-
en seriously. 9 Because most federal statutes concerning Indians lack a nexus to
Justice Thomas's definition of trade, they would be unlikely to survive the
scrutiny he urges.' The result would be a wholesale reshaping of the law that
has governed Indian affairs for the past century and a half: "an entire Title of
the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn
commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized," as
the Court stated in a challenge to a different federal Indian law statute.'
16. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2570-71 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 2567-70 (citing Natelson, supra note 14; Prakash, supra note 14).
18. A number of scholars have recently explored Adoptive Couple, but largely in the context of
equal protection and the Indian Child Welfare Act. See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, In the Name
of the Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2417444 [http://perma.cc/sF3U-RTSR];
Christopher Deluzio, Tribes and Race: The Court's Missed Opportunity in Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, 34 PACE L. REv. 509 (2014); Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Fami-
ly, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 537, 588-92 (2014); Indian Child Welfare Act- Termination of Parental
Rights-Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 127 HARV. L. REV. 368 (2013); Symposium, Perspec-
tives on Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 93 B.U. L. REy. ANNEX: PERSP. 45 (2013); Marcia A.
Zug, The Real Impact of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: The Existing Indian Family Doctrine Is
Not Affirmed, but the Future of ICWA's Placement Preferences Is Jeopardized, 42 CAP. U. L. REV.
327(2014).
1g. As others have noted, Justice Thomas's willingness to question precedent often pressures
the rest of the Court to respond, recasting the debate and potentially reshaping doctrine.
RALPH A. RossuM, UNDERSTANDING CLARENCE THOMAS: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RESTORATION 214-21 (2014); Jeffrey Toobin, Partners, 87 NEw YORKER 40-51
(2011). Last Term, for instance, Justice Thomas secured the support of three other Justices
in challenging the long-standing doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045-55 (2014) (5-4 decision) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas's Bay Mills dissent did not explicitly question federal authority, as his earlier
concurrences did. Nonetheless, he invoked many of the same principles as in his Lara and
Adoptive Couple concurrences, particularly solicitude for state sovereignty over tribal sover-
eignty. Id. at 2047.
2o. Cf. Marcia Zug, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Two-and-a-Half Ways to Destroy Indian Law,
111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 46, 50-51 (2013) (observing, prior to the ruling, that "if
the Court were to find that ICWA is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress's authori-
ty under the Indian Commerce Clause, the impact of this decision on Indian tribes would be
... devastating" and would "essentially destroy.., the majority of Indian law").
21. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974). Morton arose as an equal protection and statu-
tory challenge to a federal statute providing an employment preference to qualified Indians.
io16
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Justice Thomas's provocative claims provide an excellent opportunity to re-
visit fundamental principles of federal Indian law. Although Justice Thomas's
historical analysis is unpersuasive - as this Article will argue - he captures a
larger truth. As this Article explores, the history of the Indian Commerce
Clause's drafting, ratification, and early interpretation does not support either
"exclusive" or "plenary" federal power over Indians. In short, Justice Thomas is
right: Indian law's current doctrinal foundation in the Clause is historically un-
tenable.
Responding to Justice Thomas's revisionist critique requires moving be-
yond the widely accepted premise that federal power over Indian affairs must
rise and fall with the Indian Commerce Clause.' This preoccupation with the
Clause is an anachronism that reflects not the Constitution's eighteenth-
century drafting but nineteenth-century doctrinal innovation. To determine
the original constitutional Indian affairs power, this Article employs an alter-
nate approach to reconstruct constitutional meaning. This approach uses het-
erodox methodologies and inclusive conceptions of constitutional actors and
sources to challenge older histories centered on the Supreme Court.23
For background, see Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise ofMancari: Indian Political Rights as Ra-
cial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 958 (2o1).
22. See 133 S. Ct. at 2566 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The assertion of plenary authority must,
therefore, stand or fall on Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause.").
23. Though this is a new approach toward reconstructing the Indian Commerce Clause, it ech-
oes legal historians' calls to move beyond conventional histories in exploring constitutional
meanings. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional
Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FoRDHAM L. REV. 721, 725 (2013)
(arguing for an intellectual history approach toward ideas as "embodied, embedded, and ex-
tended" instead of originalist methodologies); Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New
Civil Rights History, 126 HAPV. L. REV. 2312, 2326 (2013) (reviewing KENNETH W. MACK,
REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012)) (describing
the "new civil rights history," which "takes an expansive approach to the cast of historical
actors, the arenas in which they acted, the types of sources that can provide information
about them, and the questions one might ask about the past"); see also Alfred L. Brophy, In-
troducing Applied Legal History, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 233 (2013) (discussing the promise and
perils of "applied legal history"); Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARv. L.
REV. F. 75 (2013) (noting the challenge in discerning authoritative historical practice); Jack
N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Meaning
Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 575 (2011) (arguing against originalist methodologies for
constructing historical textual meaning).
For examples of recent works on early constitutional history that employ a diverse
range of sources, consider the Constitution in longer temporal perspective, and explore mul-
tiple perspectives within legal thought, see MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CON-
STITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004); DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH,
CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830 (2005); and ALISON L. LACROix, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORI-
GINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010) [hereinafter LACPolx, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS].
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Employing this approach helps remedy two flaws that mar accounts of the
Indian Commerce Clause specifically and much originalist scholarship general-
ly. 4 The first is the focus on textual history divorced from historical experi-
ence. This approach is especially problematic for Indian law, which evolved not
from abstract reasoning but from customary and shared practices developed
over two centuries of cross-cultural encounter."
The second flaw is reliance on a narrow set of sources, principally the rec-
ords of the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates. This ap-
proach ignores the construction of constitutional understandings elsewhere-
in early federal and state practice, in broader public discussions, or, as this Arti-
cle emphasizes, in diplomatic negotiations with other sovereigns. The prob-
lems posed by this blinkered focus are particularly salient for the Indian Com-
merce Clause. Substantive discussion of the Clause in the sources usually relied
on by originalists is almost nonexistent.26 This paucity of evidence has led
commentators to draw drastically different conclusions based on arguments
from silence, or to conjecture about the issues the Constitution's drafters "were
alert to,"27 or to mention the Constitution only briefly before leaping forward
to cases interpreting the Clause decades later. 8
A large body of sources, however, documents late eighteenth-century un-
derstandings of federal authority over Indian affairs. The topic dominated early
federal governance, particularly under the Washington Administration of 1789
to 1797,29 when the United States entered into major treaties and land purchas-
24. This Article does not address the issue of whether the constitutional text's original public
meaning is dispositive, the subject of an enormous body of scholarship. There may be par-
ticular reason to question whether fidelity to the Constitution's original meaning is desirable
in Indian law given the document's imperialist origins. See Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage
Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014).
25. The emergence of this shared legal culture is a central theme in RICHARD WHITE, THE MID-
DLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650-1815
(1991). See also infra text accompanying note 368.
26. See infra Part I.
27. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2569 (Thomas, J., concurring).
28. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. Ray. 195, 200-02 (1984) (briefly discussing early history before turning to the
Marshall "trilogy").
29. Strict originalists might query whether this post-adoption history is relevant for recon-
structing "original understanding." But see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA's UNWRITTEN CON-
STITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 307-32 (2012) (arguing that the
practices of George Washington constitute part of the "unwritten Constitution" of the Unit-
ed States); Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
641, 657 (2013) ("The practices of the Washington Administration immediately after adop-
tion of the Constitution are generally thought relevant to understanding the original mean-
ing of Article II."); id. at 657 n.33 (collecting examples of originalist scholarship drawing on
1018
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es with Native nations, fought a lengthy and costly Indian war, and sought to
end endemic cycles of frontier violence.30 These issues implicated the era's
pressing questions of western lands, international relations, military affairs,
and national finance. Granted expansive discretion by Congress to govern In-
dian affairs,31 the executive branch gave concrete meaning to the Constitution's
sparse framework through extensive deliberations. These efforts to clarify Na-
tives' constitutional status produced a considerable archive: correspondence
and meetings among the President, his cabinet, and state executives; tran-
scripts of treaty negotiations with Native nations; and a constant flow of let-
ters, instructions, and intelligence to and from Indian agents, officials, and in-
formants on the frontier. Using these vibrant discussions, this Article draws
on, and extends into earlier periods, recent scholarship, particularly within
administrative law, emphasizing the importance of constitutional understand-
ings outside the courts.3 2
These sources reveal a very different story than that told by present-day
scholars and judges preoccupied with the Indian Commerce Clause. The most
pressing issue for early Americans was federalism: would the states or the na-
tional government possess authority over Indian relations? The Washington
Administration insisted that the federal government enjoyed exclusive consti-
tutional authority, and many state officials agreed. This claim rested not on the
Indian Commerce Clause but on the broad panoply of diplomatic and military
powers granted to the national government and denied to the states -a claim
the Washington Administration). Other scholars have stressed the Washington Administra-
tion's importance for the constitutional status of foreign relations and international law. See,
e.g., David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Consti-
tution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 932,
105-61 (2OO); Robert J. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington
Administration, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 373 (2012).
30. See generally DAVID ANDREW NICHOLS, RED GENTLEMEN AND WHITE SAVAGES: INDIANS,
FEDERALISTS, AND THE SEARCH FOR, ORDER ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 98-189 (2008) (de-
scribing federal Indian policy under the Washington Administration).
31. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-18oi,
115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1299-1300 (2006) ("When Congress came to exercise its power to regu-
late commerce with the Indian tribes, for example, it basically ceded the regulatory authority
to the President.").
32. For examples of explorations of "administrative constitutionalism," focusing particularly on
the twentieth century, see Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitu-
tionalism and the Workplace, 196o to the Present, 96 VA. L. REv. 799 (2010); Gillian E. Metz-
ger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013); and Karen M. Tani, Wel-
fare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314 (2012).
Recent scholarship has emphasized Indian affairs in the construction of the early American
administrative state. See STEPHEN J. ROCKwELL, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2010).
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similar to the present doctrine of field preemption. Proponents of state power
over Indian affairs, meanwhile, argued from inherent state sovereignty; only in
the early nineteenth century, this Article will show, did they advance a narrow
interpretation of federal power rooted in the Indian Commerce Clause.
The scope of federal power over Native nations presented a different set of
questions. The diplomatic and military powers claimed by the federal govern-
ment against the states did not imply that Natives were under U.S. jurisdic-
tion; as in foreign relations, the question was which sovereign had the authori-
ty to negotiate, or fight, with Indians. But the Washington Administration
nonetheless did not consider Native nations fully independent polities. Instead,
it argued that the law of nations granted the United States, as territorial sover-
eign, limited authority over Natives -primarily the power to restrict Native in-
ternational legal personality and, relatedly, to limit Native land sales. Building
on recent scholarship underscoring the centrality of the Constitution's interna-
tional law context,33 this Article suggests that the Washington Administration
understood both these restrictions and Native autonomy as constitutional is-
sues. Though the United States did not initially claim plenary power over Na-
tives, the doctrine crafted by the Administration provided the intellectual ante-
cedents for later, more aggressive assertions of authority.
Early Americans thus espoused legal theories similar to, but importantly
distinct from, modern Indian law doctrines of exclusive and plenary federal
power. These interpretations proved influential and durable, profoundly shap-
ing the Supreme Court's foundational decisions of the 182os and '3os. In key
33. This literature's central interpretive insight is that "[t] he fundamental purpose of the Feder-
al Constitution was to create a nation-state that the European powers would recognize, in
the practical and legal sense, as a 'civilized state' worthy of equal respect in the international
community," which required adherence to international norms. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra
note 29, at 935; see also Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Revolutionary Portfolio: Constitution-
Making and the Wider World in the American Revolution, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 759 (2014).
For historical works that similarly explore international law's influence on early America, see
ELIGA H. GOULD, AMONG THE POWERS OF THE EARTH: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE
MAKING OF A NEW WORLD EMPIRE (2012); DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST
WORLD OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (2003); PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UN-
ION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1814 (1993);
and LEONARD J. SADOSKY, REVOLUTIONARY NEGOTIATIONS: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND DIPLo-
MATS IN THE FOUNDING OF AMERICA (2009). A large legal literature explores this history to
address the extent to which the Constitution incorporates the law of nations into constitu-
tional or federal common law. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law
of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98 VA. L. REv. 729 (2012); Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard
H. Oxman, Editors' Introduction, Agora: The United States Constitution and International
Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (2004); see also Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 29, at 936 n.7
(collecting sources). This Article does not explicitly engage these doctrinal questions, alt-
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respects, the Administration's views represent the forgotten origins of federal
Indian law.
These historical precedents also provide a more solid foundation for the
basic concepts of current federal Indian law and suggest that recent denuncia-
tions of Indian law as "incoherent" and "schizophrenic" stem from a failure to
understand its history. But there are also important points of divergence be-
tween early understandings of Indian law and current doctrine. The legal posi-
tions of early Americans suggested a more limited role for states and a more
modest scope of federal power over Indian nations than present law provides;
these positions also suggest that the Court's doctrinal conclusions based on
Native dependency, particularly limitations on tribal jurisdiction, are unsup-
ported by early constitutional history.'
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief history of the
drafting and ratification of the Indian Commerce Clause. Part II considers
competing arguments over whether the Indian Commerce Clause supports
broad federal power over Indian affairs exclusive of state authority. This Part
first argues that the Clause itself is open-ended on this question, then moves
beyond the Clause to argue that many early actors located supreme federal au-
thority in Indian affairs in a holistic interpretation of the Constitution. Others
disagreed and sought to cabin federal authority, but their arguments were
based primarily on inherent state sovereignty. Part III turns to federal plenary
power over Indian tribes. Rather than locating this power in the Indian Com-
merce Clause, early federal officials claimed-based on the law of nations and
territoriality -limited sovereignty over Natives. These arguments laid the
groundwork for the doctrine of plenary power, but they also acknowledged
considerable Native autonomy. The Article concludes by exploring the conse-
quences of this account for current doctrine and Indian law scholarship.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Indian Commerce Clause originated with Article IX of the Articles of
Confederation." A compromise resulting from a vigorous debate over state au-
thority,,6 Article IX granted Congress the "sole and exclusive right and power
34. See infra text accompanying notes 399-400.
35. Like the Indian Commerce Clause in the Constitution, Article IX was the sole provision ex-
plicitly granting authority over Indian affairs in the Articles of Confederation. For that rea-
son, beginning with James Madison and continuing with Chief Justice Marshall and Justice
Thomas, scholars and judges have turned to Article IX to interpret the Indian Commerce
Clause. See infra text accompanying notes 107-1o8, 123, 172-173.
36. 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 1077-79 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 19o6).
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of ... regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians."37 It also
imposed two important qualifications. First, the national government could
only exercise authority over Indians who were "not members of any of the
States.", 8 Second, "the legislative right of any State, within its own limits,"
could not be "infringed or violated." 9 These restrictions became a source of
tension as the states and the national government vied for authority in negotia-
tions with the Creeks, Cherokees, Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee (Iro-
quois), and other Native nations.
These controversies raged as the Constitutional Convention met in June
1787,40 but no substantive discussion of Indian affairs occurred until August 18.
On that day, James Madison proposed granting Congress the power to "regu-
late affairs with the Indians as well within as without the limits of the U [nited]
States" -a clear effort to abrogate Article IX's limitations.41 The Committee of
Detail proposed an alternative. It had previously drafted a clause giving Con-
gress the authority "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States."' It now suggested adding "and with Indians, within the
Limits of any State, not subject to the laws thereof' 43 to this clause, partially
preserving Article IX's protection of state authority. Near the end of the Con-
vention, the Committee on Postponed Parts instead eliminated all qualifiers
and proposed adding only "and with the Indian tribes" to the end of the Com-
merce Clause.' The Convention accepted this provision unaltered in the final
constitutional draft.4' The final language granted Congress "Power... To reg-
ulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes. 46
The ratification debates that followed ignored the Indian Commerce
Clause. The only sustained discussion appeared in Federalist No. 42, where
James Madison praised the change from Article IX, observing that the elimina-
37. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Ablavsky, supra note 24, at 1038-39.
41. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 324 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). An
Indian affairs power appeared in the Pinckney plan, 3 id. at 607, and was referenced in mar-
ginal notes in drafts of the Committee of Detail, 2 id. at 143, but not in the Committee's final
draft, id. at 181-82.
42. 2 id. at 181.
43. Id. at 367.
44. Id. at 493, 497, 503.
45. Id. at 495.
46. Id. at 655.
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tion of the earlier qualifiers resolved earlier contentions over the division of au-
thority. 47 The only other recorded mention of the Clause in the debates came in
a tract by Anti-Federalist Abraham Yates, Jr., who attacked the Clause along
with other provisions that he claimed granted the federal government an im-
proper supremacy over Indian affairs.
48
The relative neglect of the Clause continued after ratification. The primary
statutes governing Indian affairs until the 183os were the Trade and Inter-
course Act of 1790 49 and its successors.50 These laws regulated Indian trade,
banned state and private land purchases from Indians, and they extended fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country. But these stat-
utes were only ambiguously and partially exercises of the federal Indian com-
merce power."1 The Supreme Court did not discuss the Indian Commerce
Clause until 1824, 2 and it did not examine the Clause's implications for Indian
affairs until Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 1831. s3
Unlike the robust debates around Article IX, then, the Indian Commerce
Clause provoked little discussion either at the Convention or afterward. These
traditional sources of original constitutional understanding give modern schol-
ars very little clear evidence to ground present-day doctrine, a challenge ad-
dressed in the next Part.
II. EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL POWER
Received wisdom in both doctrine and scholarship has long held that the
federal government enjoys exclusive power over Indian affairs, displacing state
authority.' Though the argument has a textual hook in the Indian Commerce
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 236-37 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
48. See Sydney, To the Citizens of the State of New York, N.Y. J., June 13-14, 1788, reprinted in
20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1153, 1156-67
(John P. Kaminski et a]. eds., 2004). Earlier scholarship attributed the Sydney essays to
Robert Yates, but the recent scholarship on ratification has established that they were writ-
ten by Abraham Yates, Jr. See id. at 1153; Sidney, N.Y. J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 19 id. at
115.
49. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
50. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 16l, 4 Stat. 729; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139; Act of Mar.
3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch.
19, 1 Stat. 329.
Si. This argument is developed infra in the text accompanying notes 168-171.
5;. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 60 (1824).
53. 30 U.S. (S Pet.) 1, 18-20 (1831).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) ("[T]he Constitution grants Con-
gress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have con-
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Clause, this conventional wisdom-which I will call the nationalist account-
ultimately rests on precedent and practice.
Recent revisionist scholarship has challenged the conventional view, rely-
ing on textual arguments that "commerce" in the Indian Commerce Clause re-
fers only to matters concerning trade. Though some of this scholarship has ar-
gued for expanded tribal autonomy, 5 other scholars have claimed that this
argument supports expanded state authority over Indian affairs, a view that
Justice Thomas adopted in his Adoptive Couple concurrence.
This Part argues that both the revisionist and nationalist accounts are inad-
equate, and it contends that the Clause's meaning was open-ended when draft-
ed: the terms "commerce" and "trade" had distinctive meanings in the Indian
context that encompassed a broad range of interactions with Indians. But ex-
amining the Indian Commerce Clause in isolation is a mistake. During and af-
ter ratification, proponents of a stronger federal government located exclusive
power over Indian affairs by adopting a holistic interpretation of the Constitu-
tion and its provisions on federal power; in contrast, opponents argued from
inherent state sovereignty rather than relying on the text of the Indian Com-
merce Clause. Textualist arguments based on a narrow interpretation of com-
merce did not gain ascendance until a generation later, when these arguments
were judicially rejected and lay quiescent until revived by current revisionist
scholars and judges.
A. The Vagueness of the Indian Commerce Clause's Original Public Meaning
Much of the revisionist scholarship on the Indian Commerce Clause has
adopted the approach of the New Originalism: it asks what the "original public
meaning" of the Clause was to a well-informed reader when adopted. 6 Justice
sistently described as 'plenary and exclusive.'" (quoting Washington v. Confederated Bands
and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1979))); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 62 (1996) ("[T]he States ... have been divested of virtually all authority over Indi-
an commerce and Indian tribes."); 1 COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra
note 4, § 5.02[2] ("Even when unexercised, the [federal] power to regulate commerce with
the Indian tribes precludes the exercise of most state authority in Indian country."); see also
Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1o55, 1o58
(1994) (arguing for federal supremacy over Indian affairs based on constitutional history).
55. I address the question of tribal sovereignty more fully in the subsequent Part. See infra text
accompanying notes 214-215.
56. See Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 417
(2013) (noting that originalists, in establishing original public meaning, "are searching for
an empirical fact: what information would these words on the page have conveyed to the
reasonable speaker of English in the relevant audience at the time of enactment?"). I do not
delve into the varieties of hypothetical readers that originalists have posited.
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Thomas argues that the answer is clear. He relies on earlier Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to argue that, in the eighteenth century, commerce consisted of
"selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes. "'
He then turns to the specific issue in Adoptive Couple. "[T]he term 'commerce
with Indian tribes' was invariably used during the time of the founding to
mean 'trade with Indians,'" he argues, citing the scholarship of Professor Rob-
ert Natelson.'8 The federal government thus lacks the power to regulate "none-
conomic activity such as adoption of [Indian] children." 9
This section questions both premises of this argument. First, it challenges
the assumption that commerce had identical meanings in the Interstate and
Indian Commerce Clauses. Second, it argues that commerce with the Indians
did not always denote trade, and, when it did, trade with the Indians had a
broader historical meaning than either Justice Thomas or Natelson acknowl-
edges. "Commerce" as used in the Indian Commerce Clause is therefore, in
New Originalist parlance, a "vague" term, which cannot alone resolve the
Clause's proper interpretation.6
i. Indian and Interstate Commerce
Recent scholarly interest in the Indian Commerce Clause is in part a spill-
over from the heated debates over the Interstate Commerce Clause. Proponents
of expansive federal commerce power have long cited early federal Indian poli-
cy to claim a broad meaning for "commerce." 6, In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
Justice Thomas takes the reverse approach: he references the narrow definition
of "commerce" he advanced in United States v. Lopez to contend for a similarly
constrained meaning of commerce with Indian tribes.62
Both positions start from the assumption of what Saikrishna Prakash calls
"intrasentence uniformity": commerce must mean the same thing in the For-
eign, Interstate, and Indian Commerce Clauses, which is why the interpreta-
sT. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2567 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
58. Id. (citing Natelson, supra note 14, at 215-16 & n.97).
5g. Id.
60. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 56, at 419 ("[L]anguage is vague insofar as it has a core meaning
that is clear, but it has a penumbral meaning where it may not be clear whether or not it ap-
plies to a particular object .... With respect to vagueness, . . . the original meaning of the
text can run out....").
61. See, e.g., AKHiL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107-o8 (2005); Jack
M. Balkin, Commerce, lo9 MICH. L. REv. 1, 24-25 (2oio).
62. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2567 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
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tion of one clause can illuminate another.6 3 Prakash defends this presumption
in part with history: "nothing," he claims, "in the Commerce Clause's text or
original understanding actually suggests that the Founders understood 'regu-
late commerce' as having multiple meanings." 64
Yet evidence suggests that Indian "commerce" did mean something differ-
ent in 1787 and 1788 than foreign or interstate commerce. 6, When the Clause
was drafted, the power Madison had proposed over "Indian affairs" was tacked
66on, late, to a clause already encompassing interstate and foreign commerce.
The Convention thus devised the power over interstate and foreign "com-
merce" before anyone thought about including Indians.67 And unlike the Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Clauses, the Indian Commerce Clause had an ex-
plicit predecessor in the Articles of Confederation.68 Unlike the other Clauses,
then, the delegates framed all proposed modifications of the power over Indian
affairs against the earlier authority granted in the Articles.
Ratification debates continued this pattern. Of hundreds of discussions of
commerce, only a handful considered trade with the Indians. The vast majority
63. Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uni-
formity, 5S ARK. L. REV. 1149 (2003); see also Balkin, supra note 61, at 13 ("Whatever 'regulate'
and 'commerce' refer to, there is a strong argument that they have the same semantic mean-
ing with the [sic] respect to all three examples."); Natelson, supra note 14, at 216 ("I have
been able to find virtually no clear evidence from the Founding Era that users of English
varied the meaning of 'commerce' among the Indian, interstate, and foreign contexts."
(footnote omitted)).
64. Prakash, supra note 63, at 116o.
65. Others have critiqued Prakash's doctrinal and linguistic arguments. See, e.g., Adrian Ver-
meule, Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1175 (2003); cf Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, ICWA and the Commerce Clause, in THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT 30: FACING
THE FUTURE 28, 31 (Matthew L.M. Fletcher et al. eds., 2009) (describing the interpretation
of the "Three Commerce Clauses" collectively as a "significant trap that would tend to oblit-
erate the original meaning and intent of the Indian Commerce Clause").
66. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
67. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporaty
Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 467-68 (1941) ("The Indian trade was a special subject with
a definite content, which had been within the jurisdiction of congress under the articles of
confederation .... It thus derived from a totally different branch of the Randolph outline
than did the control over foreign and interstate commerce. Nor ... did [they] emerge sim-
ultaneously as co-ordinated parts of a whole .... By th~e] time [the Indian Commerce
Clause was added] the larger part of the discussion in the federal convention relative to
commercial regulations was over, and in that which did take place later there is no language
relating even remotely to the Indian trade.").
68. The Articles addressed the right of state citizens to enjoy "the privileges of trade and com-
merce" in another state, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1, and endorsed
federal power to enter treaties of commerce, id. art. IX, para. i, but contained no provision
analogous to its grant of federal authority over Indian affairs.
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concerned overseas commerce with foreign nations, occasionally including in-
terstate commerce.6 9 One ratification discussion even seemed to exclude Indian
trade from the concept of "commerce."7' The only two mentions of the Indian
Commerce Clause discussed the Clause's implications for "Indian affairs"
alone, contrasting the Clause's grant of authority with the earlier authority un-
der the Articles.7' In short, no one during ratification interpreted the Indian
Commerce Clause to shed light on the Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Clauses, or vice versa.
There is also evidence that at least one "Founder" understood commerce to
have distinct meanings in the three Clauses. During the 1791 national bank
controversy, Attorney General Edmund Randolph - the Convention delegate
who wrote the Commerce Clause's first draft'-offered his opinion on the
bank's constitutionality. 73 He divided the Commerce Clause into its three parts,
each with a corresponding series of powers.74 "[W]ith respect to foreign na-
tions," the Clause encompassed duties, custom house regulations, and embar-
goes. 75 For the states, it permitted establishing the "forms" of interstate com-
mercial intercourse.76 And for the tribes, Randolph identified four powers
under the Indian Commerce Clause: "I. to prohibit the Indians from coming
into, or trading within, the United States. 2. to admit them with or without re-
strictions. 3. to prohibit citizens of the United States from trading with them;
or 4. to permit with or without restrictions."' Each of Randolph's construc-
tions related to trade, but with different inflections: the Indian commerce pow-
ers were more expansive and more concerned with government regulation than
were the customs-focused understandings of the Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Clauses.
69. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
101, 114-25 (2001) (surveying usages of "commerce" at the Convention and in state ratifica-
tion debates, without a single reference to Indian tribes).
70. At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson noted that inhabitants of the "west-
ern extremity of this state" would "care not what restraints are laid upon our commerce,"
without mentioning the region's extensive involvement in the Indian trade. Pennsylvania
Convention Debates, ii Dec. 1787, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 550, 558 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
72. See William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 229-30 (2012).
73. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Feb. 12, 1791), in 7 PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 330, 331-37 (Jack D. Warren, Jr., ed., 1987).
74. Id. at 334-35.
7s. Id. at 334.
76. Id. at 334-35.
77. Id.
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There was good reason for Randolph's differentiation: trade with Indians
had a different meaning and valence than other forms of trade, as the subse-
quent section explores. Commerce with Indian tribes must be interpreted on
its own terms rather than in the shadow of heated debates over the Interstate
Commerce Clause. 7
2. The Broad Meaning of Trade with Indians
Drawing on Natelson's scholarship, Justice Thomas asserts that commerce
with Indian tribes meant only "trade with Indians" at the time of the Constitu-
tion's drafting.7' There are two problems with this argument. First, commerce
with Indians did not exclusively mean trade. Second, trade with Indians was an
expansive category that encompassed more than the narrowly economic trans-
actions Justice Thomas envisions.
"Commerce" was a term only occasionally applied to Indian affairs. The
phrases "commerce with the Indians" or "commerce with Indians" appeared in
only a handful of eighteenth-century American publications. 8 Considerably
more significant were the terms "intercourse" and "trade." The two terms cap-
tioned Congress's first law addressing Indian affairs, the Trade and Intercourse
Act.8 , "Intercourse" was the era's predominant diplomatic and legal term of art
78. To be clear, I am not arguing that the Foreign or Interstate Commerce Clauses do, or do
not, require a commercial nexus. As the next section explores, there are suggestive parallels
between the diplomatic context implicated in the Indian Commerce Clause and the Foreign
Commerce Clause. My point, in this and the following section, is that the Indian Commerce
Clause should be understood on its own terms and based on its own history. "Indian Af-
fairs," I argue, was a distinct body of governance, and so evidence drawn from the other
Commerce Clauses should not be extrapolated lightly to the Indian Commerce Clause, and
vice versa.
79. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2567 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
Natelson, supra note 14, at 215-16 & n.97). Natelson's argument rests on full-text searches of
eighteenth-century printed texts using the term "commerce with Indians" or "commerce
with Indian tribes." Natelson, supra note 14, at 215-16 & n.97.
8o. Early American Imprints-the database Natelson employed- reports only fourteen instances
of "commerce with the Indians," one instance of "commerce with Indians," and seven in-
stances of "commerce with the Indian tribes" in all works printed between 1639 and 18oo in
what became the United States. Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-18oo, READEx,
http://infoweb.newsbank.comiw-search/we/Evans [http://perma.cc/4HFG-7U48].
Si. Both terms appear in the definition of "commerce" that Justice Thomas cites. Adoptive Cou-
p/e, 133 S. Ct. at 2567 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing i S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (4 th rev. ed. 1773) (reprint 1978)). Based on appearance in Google
Books' database of English language materials printed between 170o and 18oo, the Google
Ngram shows the phrase "intercourse with the Indians" passing "commerce with the Indi-
ans" in frequency in the mid-i77os, while both were dwarfed by "trade with the Indians."
Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.con/ngrams [http://perma.cc/H4L8
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to describe relations between Natives and white settlers.8 2 Several of the (few)
discussions of "commerce" with Indians in the eighteenth century reflect a sim-
ilar meaning. They speak, for instance, of "commerce" as the exchange of reli-
gious ideas among tribes, s3 or sexual intercourse with Indian women, 4 thus
using the term to encompass interaction broadly defined with and among Na-
tive nations. 8'
Both "commerce" and "intercourse," though, were dwarfed by eighteenth-
century occurrences of the term "trade" to describe relations with Natives. Jus-
tice Thomas presumes that the meaning of Indian "trade" requires no further
examination, assuming trade encompassed only "economic" activity. History
suggests otherwise.
When placed alongside "with the Indians," "trade" took on a different
character. Although it still referred to buying, selling, trading, exchanging, and
gifting items, these were not primarily commercial transactions. Instead,
-GZF3] (search "Graph these comma-separated phrases" for "intercourse with the Indians,
commerce with the Indians, trade with the Indians"; then follow "Search lots of books" hy-
perlink). Similarly, in the first volume of the American State Papers: Indian Affairs, cover-
ing 1789 to 1815, the word "trade" appears 258 times; "intercourse," 77 times; and "com-
merce," 32 times. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDLAN AFFAIRS (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St.
Clair Clarke eds., Gales & Seaton 1832).
82. This is the usage of the word in the era's diplomatic correspondence with and about Indian
nations. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49 (describing the intent to restore "a
friendly intercourse" between the United States and warring tribes, and discussing land ces-
sions intended for "convenient intercourse"). Chief Justice Marshall famously concluded
that "Commerce . . . is intercourse," Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824),
and other commentators have stressed the importance of intercourse in interpreting the In-
terstate Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 61, at 15-29.
83. See, e.g., THOMAS HUTCHINSON, 2 THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETS-BAY,
FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT THEREOF IN 1628, at 474 n. (1765) (quoting seventeenth-
century sources discussing how Indian nations, through "commerce" with other Indian na-
tions, disseminated ideas about "idols and idolatry" (emphasis added)).
84. See 2 A NEW COLLECTION OF VOYAGES, DISCOVERIES AND TRAVELS 72 (1767) ("Some would
be apt to suspect [that the supposedly white-skinned Natives of Central America] might be
the offspring of some European father: but beside that the Europeans come little here, and
have little commerce with the Indian women when they do come...."); 2 MEMOIRS OF THE
RIGHT HONORABLE LORD VISCOUNT CHERINGTON 368 (1782) (recounting his illness after a
voyage to Brazil: "I firmly believe my disorder was contracted by too free a commerce with
Indian women").
85. See REV. C. BROWN, ITINERARiUM NOVI TESTAMENTI app. at 20 (1784) (recounting a travel-
er's story that Natives informed him that "your Brethren will have no Commerce with Indi-
ans, and if any of ours enter into their Country, they instantly kill them; neither do any of
your brethren pass into our Country"); DEATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FOURTH CONGRESS pt. 2, at 254 (Bioren
& Madan 1796) (using the phrases "commerce with the Indians" and "intercourse with these
tribes" as synonyms).
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"trade" was a form of diplomacy and politics, "the defining feature of Native-
colonial relations., 8 6 Though all forms of trade were freighted with diverse
meanings, trade with the Indians was understood almost solely through this
political and diplomatic lens, especially by the political elite.8 ' As George
Washington stated, "[T]he trade of the Indians is a main mean of their politi-
cal management. American officials insisted that trade with Indian tribes
was "the most essential means of Securing their Friendship.",8  Those officials
fretted that the goods of Spanish and British traders would turn Indians into
pawns of the nation's opponents. 9° Such was the "power and influence of
trade" among the Indians, they believed, that it could start and stop wars. 9'
"Friendship and trade without end" was stamped on the medals that the gov-
ernment distributed to Indian chiefs to secure them to the federal interest. 92
Trade was so central to federal diplomacy with Indian nations that, in 1796,
Congress created a series of federally run trading posts to provide Natives with
86. JOSEPH M. HALL, JR., ZAMUMO'S GIFTS: INDIAN-EUROPEAN EXCHANGE IN THE COLONIAL
SOUTHEAST 5 (2009). For other works stressing the centrality of exchange between Indians
and Euroamericans, see KATHRYN E. HOLLAND BRAUND, DEERSKINS & DUFFELS: THE CREEK
INDIAN TRADE WITH ANGLO-AMERICA, 1685-1815 (1993); DANIEL K. RICHTER, FACING EAST
FROM INDIAN COUNTRY: A NATIVE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICA 174-79 (2OO1); and DANIEL
H. USNER, JR., INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND SLAVES IN A FRONTIER EXCHANGE ECONOMY: THE
LOWER MISSISSIPPI VALLEY BEFORE 1783 (1992).
87. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN
TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS (1790-1834), at 85 (1962) ("It was a commonplace [in early
America] that Indian allegiance and friendship depended ultimately on the tenuous ties of
trade.").
88. Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate (Aug. 4, 1790), in 6 THE PA-
PERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 188, 189 (Mark A. Mastromarino ed.,
1996).
89. Letter from Leonard Marbury to George Washington (Apr. 21, 1792), in 1o THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 302, 303 (Robert F. Haggard & Mark A.
Mastromarino eds., 2002).
go. See, e.g., Letter from William Blount and Andrew Pickens to Henry Knox (Aug. 1, 1793), in
13 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 359, 359-62 (Christine
Steinberg Patrick ed., 2007).
91. Letter from William Blount to the Sec'y of War (Aug. 13, 1793), in 4 THE TERRITORIAL PA-
PERS OF THE UNITED STATES 297, 298 (Clarence Edward Carter ed., 1936); see also id. at 297
("The Trade with the Indians affords the possessors of it so many opportunities to give
springs to their actions and complexion to their national conduct. .. ").
9a. Letter from Josef Ignacio de Viar and Josef de Jaudenes to Thomas Jefferson (May 25, 1792),
in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 118, 119 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995).
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goods at cost.93 Never intended to run a profit, these so-called "factories" re-
quired constant subsidies.94
Because of this political and diplomatic understanding, the Indian trade en-
compassed the exchange of an extraordinary range of items. Most obvious is
land. Negotiating land cessions, central to federal Indian policy, often hinged
on making Natives dependent on trade goods, for which tribes ultimately paid
in territory. 9 But Indians and colonists also bought, sold, and exchanged peo-
ple: through the negotiated return of captives 96 and through the Indian slave
trade-a "Commerce with the Indians" in which Anglo-Americans purchased
Natives captured in wars. 97 By the 1780s, the trade in Indian slaves, though
largely a legal relic in long-settled colonies,' 8 persisted on the frontier, along-
side the sale of European children captured by Indians. 99 In this way, pace Jus-
tice Thomas, trade with Indians encompassed "noneconomic activity such as
adoption of children,"'0° as Natives and Anglo-Americans adopted children
they had captured or purchased.'0 ' Trade even included rituals around seem-
93. Act of Apr. 18, 1796, ch. 13, 1 Stat. 452.
94. PRUCHA, supra note 87, at 86-93. For a thorough history of the federal Indian factories that
underscores their diplomatic role, see DAVID NICHOLS, THE ENGINES OF DIPLOMACY: Ac-
COMMODATION AND MANIPULATION AT THE UNITED STATES' INDIAN FACTORIES, 1796-1822
(forthcoming 2015).
95. For instance, Jefferson famously suggested running up Native trade debts as a means of dis-
possessing their land. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William H. Harrison, Governor
(Feb. 27, 1803), in lo THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 368, 370 (Albert Ellery Bergh
ed., 1905).
96. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Creeks, art. III, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35 [here-
inafter Treaty of New York]; Treaty of Hopewell, U.S.-Cherokees, arts. I & II, Nov. 28,
1785, 7 Stat. 18.
97. RALPH SANDIFORD, A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF THE PRACTICE OF THE TIMES 22 (Benjamin
Franklin & Hugh Meredith 1729).
98. Even behind the frontier, the legal issues raised by Indian slavery persisted both in statutes
and in a widespread judicial debate over whether Indians could still be held as slaves. See
DEBORAH A. ROSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND STATE LAW: SOVEREIGNTY, RACE, AND CITIZEN-
SHIP, 1790-1880, at 85-89 (2007); Gregory Ablavsky, Comment, Making Indians White: The
judicial Abolition of Native Slavery in Revolutionary Virginia and Its Racial Legacy, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 1457, 1494-1517 (2011).
99. For an introduction to recent historical literature on this topic, see INDIAN SLAVERY IN CO-
LONIAL AMERICA (Alan Gallay ed., 2009). In 1790, the governor of the Northwest Territory
negotiated the return of an American child captured by Indians and resold, then allegedly
held as security for a debt. Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Manuel Perez (May 20, 1790), in 2
THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 238, 238 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed.,
1936).
loo. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2567 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
lol. Adoption of Native children was widespread in the early Republic; Andrew Jackson famous-
ly adopted a Creek child. See generally Dawn Peterson, Unusual Sympathies: Settler Imperi-
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ingly non-economic crimes like murder: common Native practice, embraced by
early federal officials, required compensation by "covering the grave" through
the payment of goods to victims.10 2
The point is not that late eighteenth-century slavery is analogous to pre-
sent-day voluntary adoptions, or that the modern criminal justice system is the
same as diplomatic payments for murder. Instead, recognizing the past's dis-
continuity with the present expands the meaning of terms like "trade" in ways
that textual searches alone elide. "Trade with the Indians" encompassed a rich
constellation of exchanges, including buying and selling people and lives.
Defining "commerce with the Indian tribes" as trade thus helps little in
construing the Indian Commerce Clause's scope. Even if we accept the ques-
tionable proposition that "commerce with Indians" meant only selling, buying,
and bartering, in Indian country these were never straightforwardly economic
activities. Rather, as Justice Thomas's own examples establish,0 3 these activi-
ties were understood through the lens of cross-cultural diplomacy. This does
not mean that "trade" included all relations with Indians,"°4 but neither was its
meaning so cramped as to preclude all applications now deemed "noncommer-
cial." In short, the "original public meaning" of Indian commerce cannot alone
provide a clear basis for cabining federal authority over Indian affairs.'05
alism, Slavery, and the Politics of Adoption in the Early U. S. Republic (2011) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, New York University).
1o2. ALAN TAYLOR, THE DIVIDED GROUND: INDIANS, SETTLERS AND THE NORTHERN BORDERLAND
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 28-33 (2006).
103. Justice Thomas observes that regulating Indian trade was necessary because traders "all too
often abused their Indian trading partners, through fraud, exorbitant prices, extortion, and
physical invasion of Indian territory," which "provoked violent Indian retaliation." Adoptive
Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2567-68 (Thomas, J., concurring). These examples suggest that regula-
tion of the Indian trade stemmed from a diplomatic understanding of exchange, in which
abuses threatened peaceful relations between Native Nations and Anglo-Americans.
104. Many early Americans subscribed to Enlightenment notions that defined trade and com-
merce in opposition to conquest and warfare. Cf J. G. A POCOCK, 3 BARBARIsM AND RELI-
GION 317-24, 373-74 (1999). Hence the association in Indian affairs of "trade" with "peace"
and "friendship"; the term was rarely used to describe warfare with Natives.
105. Two other textual arguments merit brief discussion. First, Justice Thomas argues that, be-
cause the Indian Commerce Clause refers only to tribes, it does not provide the federal gov-
ernment authority over individual Indians. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2567-69 (Thomas,
J., concurring). This sharp dichotomy finds no support in historical evidence. Federal offi-
cials in the late eighteenth century regarded individual Indians as tribal members, akin to
foreign citizens, and consistently described them based on their respective tribal affiliation -
as Delawares, Creeks, etc. The Trade and Intercourse Act criminalized unlicensed trade both
.with the Indian tribes" and "with the Indians" interchangeably, as well as barring land
sales made "by any Indians" and criminalizing attacks against "any peaceable and friendly
Indian or Indians" within Indian country. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, §§ 1, 4-5, 1 Stat. 137,
137-38.
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B. Interpreting Silence: The Indian Commerce Clause's Drafting and Adoption
History
To bolster their textual arguments, both revisionists -proposing a narrow
scope for the Indian Commerce Clause - and nationalists - advancing a more
expansive interpretation-have relied on the Clause's drafting and adoption
history. The problem confronting both sets of scholars is that the Clause's his-
tory is sparse: a series of unexplained textual changes, coupled with two men-
tions in the ratification debates, one a sentence long. , 6 Both revisionists and
nationalists have reached their conclusions based on the implications of silence.
This section challenges both revisionist and nationalist claims, arguing that si-
lence on the Indian Commerce Clause implied neither narrow nor exclusive
federal power; instead, it suggested the Clause's open-endedness. The Clause's
drafting history thus provides no basis to resolve its contested scope.
i. Silence as Consensus: Shortcomings of the Revisionist and Nationalist
Accounts
Justice Thomas, drawing again from Natelson, offers a historical account
for a "limited construction of the Indian Commerce Clause."1 °7 He reads the
Clause's drafting history in light of Article IX's solicitude for states' legislative
rights: "[t]his concern for state power reemerged during the drafting of the
Constitution," he contends, arguing that the rejection of Madison's proposal in
favor of a "far narrower" version that "echoed the Articles of Confederation"
demonstrated an intention to limit federal power. 18
Omitted from this account are the six years between the Articles and the
Constitution, a period when states' assertions of authority against the federal
Second, Natelson argues that references to tribes as nations do not signify acknowl-
edgment of their separate sovereign status because "the word 'nation' did not necessarily
evoke the association with political sovereignty it evokes today." Natelson, supra note 14, at
259. In fact, period documents suggest that those opposed to tribal sovereignty understood
the term "nations" to connote independent status, and so advocated abandoning it. See
James Duane's Views on Indian Negotiations (July/Aug. 1784), in 18 EARLYAMmERCAN INDI-
AN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWs, 1607-1789: REVOLUTION AND CONFEDERATION 299,
299-300 (Colin G. Calloway ed., 1994) [hereinafter EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS]
(arguing that, in negotiations with the Haudenosaunee, "I woud never suffer [to use] the
word nations, or Six Nations... or any other Form which woud revive or seem to confirm
[the Natives'] former Ideas of Independence").
1o6. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
107. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2569 (Thomas, J., concurring).
ios. Id.
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government undermined national Indian policy and spawned costly wars. 9
Briefly told, expansionist states such as New York, North Carolina, and Geor-
gia seized on the Articles' ambiguous language to assert sole jurisdiction over
Natives and their lands and to challenge federal treaties."0 This interference
horrified nationalists. James Madison feared that states' interpretation of Arti-
cle IX would "destroy the authority of Congress altogether.... The congres-
sional Committee on Southern Indians argued that states' self-interested inter-
pretations would render federal power over Indian affairs a "mere nullity" and
would make Article IX an "absurdity in theory as well as in practice.""' By
1787, nationalist predictions that state interference would lead to expensive
wars were vindicated by looming hostilities against powerful Native confedera-
cies." 3
Though Natelson claims these struggles were "a back-and-forth affair,"
with "no clear trend in the direction of either local or central control," they re-
flect more than disagreement." 4 The Articles' structure empowered a deter-
mined minority to block national action, and the federal government was de-
pendent on state cooperation. Thus, though centralized federal authority over
Indian affairs enjoyed widespread support,"' challenges to state authority suc-
cumbed to the Articles' byzantine procedures," 6 while Madison and others
despaired that the national government was too weak to enforce what they re-
garded as the correct interpretation of Article IX."17
Events at the Constitutional Convention must be read against this back-
ground. As I have argued elsewhere, the most significant constitutional re-
forms for Indian affairs stemmed from structural changes that increased federal
1O9. I have explored this history in detail elsewhere. See Ablavsky, supra note z4, at 1009-38.
110. Id.
m1. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Nov. 27, 1784), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 156, 156 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).
112. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 457, 459 (Roscoe R. Hill ed.,
1936).
113. REGINALD HORSMAN, ExPANsION AND AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, 1783-1812, at 4-15, 31
(1967).
114. Natelson, supra note 14, at 235.
115. Clinton, supra note 54, at 1124-47.
116. A report condemning state interference in Indian affairs failed despite the support of fifteen
of twenty delegates; with only seven states present, passage required unanimity. 33 JOUR-
NALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 112, at 463. Delegates from
three additional states also voted, but because the states lacked the two delegates required
under the Articles, these votes were purely symbolic.
117. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, supra note 111, at 157.
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power rather than from the Indian Commerce Clause itself." 8 But the Clause's
evolution hardly suggests solicitude for "state power."" 9 Justice Thomas em-
phasizes the rejection of the amendment proposed by Madison that would have
granted federal authority both "within" and "without" the states.'20 Justice
Thomas instead draws attention to the amendment proposed by the Commit-
tee of Detail that would have barred federal authority over Indians subject to
state laws.' 2' But the Convention rejected both proposals, an outcome that con-
ceded more to Madison and proponents of federal authority than to its oppo-
nents. Unlike Article IX, nothing in the final draft of the Indian Commerce
Clause guaranteed state authority, nor did its phrasing bar federal authority
within state borders - the difficulty Madison's initial proposal had sought to
remedy. Moreover, although the Indian Commerce Clause no longer provided
that federal authority was "sole" or "exclusive," as Article IX had, the Constitu-
tion eschewed these labels for all of the federal government's enumerated pow-
ers, opting instead for broad federal authority through the Supremacy
Clause." In short, the ultimate adoption of federal power over Indian com-
merce without any qualifiers endorsed Madison's position more than it pro-
tected state authority.
Madison certainly read the Indian Commerce Clause that way, claiming
victory in Federalist No. 42, where he stressed that the Clause "is very properly
unfettered from two limitations in the Articles of Confederation, which render
the provision obscure and contradictory."123 The only other explicit mention of
118. Ablavsky, supra note 24, at 1038-50.
iig. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2569 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring). On the
Clause's development, see supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
120. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 3569.
121. Id. ("The Committee[ of Detail]'s version, which echoed the Articles of Confederation, was
far narrower than Madison's proposal.").
12. See LACRoIx, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 23, at 171 ("The Supremacy Clause iden-
tified and created a body of supreme law of the land that was, according to Article I, circum-
scribed along subject-specific lines such that there was no concurrence with the substantive
areas of state law."). Other scholars have noted that a presumption of exclusivity of federal
authority, rather than concurrence, guided jurisprudence into the early nineteenth century.
See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 787-800
(1994); Theodore W. Ruger, Preempting the People: The Judicial Role in Regulatory Concur-
rency and Its Implication for Popular Lawmaking, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1029, 1038-42 (2006).
Natelson overlooks this history when he claims that the omission of language of exclusivity
allows for concurrent state jurisdiction over Indian commerce. Natelson, supra note 14, at
237-41. Moreover, any supposed state authority was very short-lived, as Congress quickly
passed comprehensive legislation to regulate Indian commerce. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1
Stat. 137. Even under modem preemption principles, this would likely bar concurrent state
jurisdiction.
123. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
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the Clause during ratification was a single line in Anti-Federalist Abraham
Yates, Jr.'s broader denunciation of national Indian policy.' 4 Yates, a defender
of New York's prerogatives, argued that in conjunction with other constitu-
tional provisions, the adoption of the Clause would "totally surrender into the
hands of Congress the management and regulation of the Indian affairs, and
expose the Indian trade to an improper government.
1 2
Justice Thomas argues that more important than these discussions was
what was not said. The "nearly nonexistent" opposition to the Indian Com-
merce Clause, he argues, demonstrates that "[t]he ratifiers almost certainly
understood the Clause to confer a relatively modest power on Congress-
namely, the power to regulate trade with Indian tribes living beyond state bor-
ders. ' '26 But "silence" here is not as "revealing" as Justice Thomas suggests. 27
Unlike Yates, other Anti-Federalists accepted paramount federal authority over
Indian affairs.128 Article IX had already established the abstract principle of fed-
eral supremacy over Indian commerce; in this context, removing the Article's
qualifiers looked more like the clarification of an ambiguous provision than a
radical new departure. Perhaps for this reason, the ratification debate over In-
dian affairs focused on the Constitution's other provisions -particularly the
Treaty and War Powers -as Justice Thomas's own citations establish. 19 Si-
124. Sydney, supra note 48, at 1158. Natelson's attribution of this essay to Robert Yates, Natelson,
supra note 14, at 248, perpetuates an error rejected by historians of ratification, see supra note
48.
125. Sydney, supra note 48, at 1158. Neither Justice Thomas nor Natelson discusses this portion
of Yates's writing, though both cite his views. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2569 (Thomas,
J., concurring); Natelson, supra note 14, at 247-48. Natelson paraphrases the quotation
above, omitting the section concerning "Indian affairs," and then writes that if a reasonable
interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause "included plenary authority over Indian af-
fairs, [Yates] certainly would have pointed it out." Natelson, supra note 14, at 247-48.
126. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2569 (Thomas, J., concurring).
127. Id. Justice Thomas's interpretation also reads the limitations of Article IX back into the Indi-
an Commerce Clause, despite the omission of this language.
128. Justice Thomas's evidence supports this point. Id. at 2570 (citing Brutus, (Letter) X, N.Y. J.,
Jan. 24, 1788, in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 462, 465 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 2012)). Justice Thomas implies that Anti-
Federalist concessions were limited to trade, but evidence suggests a broader scope. See, e.g.,
Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican, Letter I (Oct. 8, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 18, 24 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) ("Let the general government['s] ... powers extend exclu-
sively to all foreign concerns, causes arising on the seas, to commerce, imports, armies, na-
vies, Indian affairs, peace and war... leaving the internal police of the community, in other
respects, exclusively to the state governments .... ." (emphasis added)).
129. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2570 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing discussions of a
federal standing army and a colloquy from the Virginia ratifying convention involving Indi-
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lence, in short, cannot be read to demonstrate a narrow scope for federal pow-
er.
But this same silence also cannot be read as conclusive evidence of an intent
to enshrine broad federal power, as others have interpreted it.' Robert Clin-
ton, this position's most thorough proponent, argues that the conflicts under
the Articles of Confederation produced a consensus in favor of exclusive na-
tional control.13" ' Dismissing the textual change from "Affairs" to "Commerce"
as stylistic,'32 Clinton follows Madison in arguing that the omission of provi-
sions protecting state authority codified federal supremacy, a shift that "re-
quired and consumed little debate."' The lack of discussion of the Clause thus
reflected widespread agreement.'- 4
Though more compelling, this consensus-based account has gaps of its
own. It is difficult to see how an agreement so universal could emerge so quick-
ly from contentious struggles for authority under the Articles. These controver-
sies seemingly convinced many, including many critics of the Constitution,
that federal supremacy over Indian affairs was necessary. But Yates spoke for a
significant unpersuaded minority, and many of these strong critics of a nation-
al Indian affairs power were also delegates at the Convention. 3 ' Furthermore,
if such a consensus existed, it proved remarkably fleeting: under the new Con-
stitution, expansionist states continued to defy federal authority., 6 These par-
allels between pre- and post-ratification history make it implausible to inter-
pret the silence over the Indian Commerce Clause as universal acquiescence to
federal supremacy.
an land purchases); see also Ablavsky, supra note 24, at 1050-75 (arguing for the centrality of
these provisions in ratification debates over Indian affairs).
130. Clinton, supra note 54, at 1164; Robert J. Miller, American Indian Influence on the United
States Constitution and Its Framers, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 133, 151-55 (1993).
131. Clinton, supra note 54, at lO64-1147.
132. Id. at 1156 (arguing "no change in the meaning or scope of matters committed to Congress
appears to have been intended by" the shift from "affairs" to "commerce").
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1158; see also PRUCHA, supra note 94, at 41 ("The lack of debate on the question [of In-
dian matters] indicates, perhaps, how universally it was agreed that Indian affairs were to be
left in the hands of the federal government.").
135. See FRANcIs G. HUTCMNS, TIBES AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 67-69 (2000) (noting
that strong opponents of federal authority over Indian affairs attended the Convention and
recommended ratification).
136. See ROSEN, supra note 98, at 19-77 (describing state assertions of authority over Indian af-
fairs in defiance of the federal government); infra Part II.C.2.
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2. Silence as Ambiguity: The Open-Ended Indian Commerce Clause
What, then, to make of the Indian Commerce Clause and its drafting? The
problem seems to be the assumption, shared by both sides in this interpretive
debate, that the meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause was "clear" when
drafted and ratified. 3 7 Because the Clause's unenlightening text was shaped,
unrecorded, behind committee doors, clarity is elusive.
There is a compelling case, though, that the Clause was open-ended when
drafted. Nearly all the enumerated powers were late additions and occasioned
little of the heated discussion that surrounded issues of representation or the
structure of the national government.138 The Indian Commerce Clause in par-
ticular was an afterthought, its earliest versions literally scrawled in the mar-
gins of constitutional drafts.139 This lack of attention likely reflected two con-
siderations. First, the Articles of Confederation had already granted the
national government considerable power over Indian affairs, even if that au-
thority's scope was contested. The Indian Commerce Clause was therefore akin
to other provisions from Article IX that were transposed into Article I, Section
8, of the Constitution without debate-the power to create post offices, to coin
money, to fix weights and measures.4 0 Second, because treaties with Native
nations had caused the primary struggles between states and the national gov-
ernment under the Articles, the Indian Commerce Clause was less important
than changes bolstering federal treaty power.
Indeed, the final phrasing of the Indian Commerce Clause likely made it
particularly uncontroversial, because the Convention rejected all qualifiers en-
137. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2569 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("The ratifiers almost certainly understood the Clause . . . ." (emphasis added)); id. ("It is,
thus, clear that the Framers of the Constitution . . . ." (emphasis added)); Clinton, supra
note 54, at 1157 ("[T] he meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause and the intent of the fram-
ers seems reasonably clear. . . ." (emphasis added)); Natelson, supra note 14, at 248 (with
reference to the Commerce Clause as a whole, interpreting ratification silence on the Clause
as a "clear indication that its scope was understood to be fairly narrow" (emphasis added)).
138. See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
288-89 (2009) ("[T]he delegates seemed disinclined even to raise questions about most of
the specifically enumerated powers .... [S]urprisingly- given subsequent contention over
the extent and limits of congressional power-with just a few exceptions the discussion pro-
voked little controversy."); see also Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional
Strategies for Protecting Rights: The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 373-77
(2007) ("Little debate took place after [the C]ommittee [on Detail] chose to enumerate spe-
cific federal powers .... What mattered were the rules for staffing the national government
and the rules for making national laws, not legal limitations on national power.").
139. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 41, at 143; Committee of
Detail Documents, 135 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 239, 273 (2011).
140. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 5, 7.
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dorsing either the nationalist or the state sovereignty position. Though Madi-
son stressed the removal of Article IX's qualifying language, 41 opponents of
federal power could read the Clause to modify existing arrangements very lit-
tle, since the Clause said nothing explicitly barring concurrent state authority.
Contrary to the claim that the Convention's silence on the Clause reflected a
consensus in favor of a single "clear" meaning, then, the Clause's open-
endedness may best explain the lack of debate at the Convention. The resulting
language allowed both proponents and critics of federal authority to claim vic-
tory.1
42
Present-day interpreters of the Indian Commerce Clause have thus stum-
bled onto what seems to have been the Clause's actual "original understand-
ing": dueling interpretations that each construed the Clause to endorse their
own position. The two sides were not equal; when the Clause was read in the
context of the entire Constitution, the nationalists had the more compelling ar-
gument. 43 And they ultimately prevailed, at least in formal law.' 4 Yet those
embracing state authority offered a strong counterargument- particularly
when the Clause was read in isolation-and long shaped events on the
ground. 14' The key point is that both arguments were defensible interpreta-
tions of the Clause and its history. 46 The only thing that the Clause explicitly
did was grant some version of the Indian affairs authority outlined in Article IX
of the Articles of Confederation to the new federal government. Neither the
Clause's terse language nor its drafting history clearly defined the scope of that
authority.
C. Original Understandings ofExclusive Federal Power over Indian Affairs
To understand the Constitution's implications for federal authority over
Indian affairs, we must look beyond the Indian Commerce Clause. The 178os
141. See supra text accompanying note 47 (discussing Madison's views of the Indian Commerce
Clause in Federalist No. 42).
142. Cf. Bernadette Meyler, The New Originalism in Constitutional Law: Accepting Contested Mean-
ings, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 803, 819-26 (2013) (arguing that many constitutional texts poten-
tially possess multiple contested meanings).
143. See infra Part II.C.i.
144. See infra text accompanying notes 172-174.
145. See infra Part II.C.2.
146. Cf. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, S4 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2002)
("Legislative ambiguity reaches its peak when a statute is so elegantly crafted that it credibly
supports multiple inconsistent interpretations by legislators and judges. Legislators with
opposing views can then claim that they have prevailed in the legislative arena.").
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and '9os witnessed a vibrant debate over federalism and relations with Indians.
Yet little of this discussion turned on the Clause, and little of it occurred in
court. The debate was over the new nation's structure, in which the Washing-
ton Administration and state executives played outsized roles.
This Part reconstructs these executive constitutional discussions. Part II.C.1
argues that many early Americans, particularly those in the Washington Ad-
ministration, subscribed to a vision of federal supremacy similar to present-day
field preemption. But this view was not universally accepted. Part II.C.2 traces
the constitutional claims of advocates for state authority over Indian affairs.
Originally, their arguments hinged on inherent state sovereignty, particularly
territorial sovereignty, rather than text. Not until the early nineteenth century
did textualist arguments gain ascendance, when proposed narrow readings of
the Indian Commerce Clause failed to become doctrine but succeeded in re-
shaping subsequent discussions of federal Indian affairs power.
1. The Constitution as Field Preemption
In relation to Indian affairs, early Americans seem to have read the Consti-
tution differently from present-day lawyers and judges. Instead of adopting the
present clause-bound approach, 147 most of those who drafted and interpreted
the Constitution wrote of authority over Indian affairs as an interrelated, co-
herent bundle of powers.
This idea came from experience. In August 1787, as the Convention was
meeting, the Continental Congress's committee on southern Indian affairs not-
ed that "managing Affairs with the Indians, had been long understood and
pretty well ascertained in this country."'48 Encompassing authority over war
and peace, purchasing lands, fixing borders, and preventing illegal settlement,
these "indivisible" powers, earlier exercised by the Crown, had passed "entire
to the Union," the committee insisted. 49 Under this well-established regime,
"[t]he laws of the State can have no effect upon a tribe of Indians or their lands
within the limits of the state so long as that tribe is independent." '
Though contested, this conception of national authority as a bundle of
powers was the dominant strand of thinking among the political elite. As I
have elaborated elsewhere, Indian affairs influenced the Constitution well be-
147. For instance, Prakash's investigation of the sources of federal plenary power over Indians
begins with the Indian Commerce Clause, then proceeds through the Property Clause, the
Treaty Power, and the War Power. See Prakash, supra note 14, at lO86-1102.
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yond the Commerce or Treaty Clauses; they affected the Supremacy Clause,
the Guarantee Clause, Article III jurisdiction, restrictions on the states, and
military powers."i 1 Most observers understood federal authority over Indian af-
fairs as emerging from the interplay of all of these clauses.
Ratification underscored this understanding of federal power. Recall Anti-
Federalist Abraham Yates, Jr.'s insistence that the Constitution granted Con-
gress supremacy over Indian affairs."5 2 To support this contention, Yates cit-
ed-alongside the Indian Commerce Clause-the Supremacy Clause, the fed-
eral government's new "legislative, executive and judicial powers," and the bar
on state tariffs without federal consent.' 3 While few were as explicit as Yates,
most concerns over Indian affairs during ratification similarly turned on an ar-
ray of provisions: the Supremacy Clause, particularly its inclusion of treaties
already "made" under the Articles; the federal judicial power to enforce Indian
treaties; the federal military establishment; and the national power of taxa-
tion.54 It was in these contexts, for instance, that most of the essays of The Fed-
eralist discussed Indians.'
Confirming Yates's fears, the Washington Administration quickly sought
to ensure "that the state-governments be prohibited from intermeddling with
the Indian tribes, to the utmost limit of the constitution.' 6 That limit, the
Administration insisted, granted it considerable latitude. Soon into his presi-
dency, George Washington informed the Governor of Pennsylvania that "the
United States . . . possess[es] the only authority of regulating an intercourse
with [the Indians], and redressing their grievances."'5 7
Washington entrusted that authority to Secretary of War Henry Knox,
whose department administered Indian affairs.,8 Knox was an ardent propo-
nent of national authority. Frustrated by state interference under the Articles,
he read the Constitution as a grant of expansive authority. "[T]he United
151. See Ablavsky, supra note 4, at 1038-49.
152. See Sydney, supra note 48, at 1158; see also supra text accompanying notes 48, 124-125.
153. Sydney, supra note 48, at 1158.
1s4. See Ablavsky, supra note 24, at 1050-75.
155. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 12 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999); THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 24, at 129 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999); THE FEDERALIST No.
25, at 131 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
156. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Oct. 28, 1792), in ii THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIENTIAL SERIES 272, 273 (Christine S. Patrick ed., 2002).
157. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Mifflin (Sept. 4, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 88, at 396.
158. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49, SO (investing the Secretary of War with "such duties as
shall... be enjoined on, or entrusted to him by the President of the United States... rela-
tive to Indian affairs").
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States have, under the constitution, the sole regulation of Indian affairs, in all
matters whatsoever," he instructed a federal Indian agent. s9 By granting this
authority over Indian affairs, the Constitution and federal laws "entirely pre-
clude all interference, either of individuals, or of States," Knox wrote another
official. 60 He voiced similar sentiments to recalcitrant state governors.161 Yet
Knox was only the most vociferous member of an administration committed to
federal supremacy over Indian relations: even Secretary of State Thomas Jeffer-
son and Attorney General Edmund Randolph, usually solicitous of state con-
16,
cerns, insisted on federal preeminence in Indian matters.
The Administration also agreed on the source of federal power over Indian
affairs: the interplay of the national government's diplomatic, military, and
commercial authority. As Knox wrote:
[A]s indian Wars almost invariably arise in consequence of disputes
relative to boundaries, or trade, and as the right of declaring War, mak-
ing treaties, and regulating commerce, are vested in the United States it
is highly proper they should have the sole direction of all measures for
the consequences of which they are responsible.
6
,
Jefferson voiced similar arguments. "[The] paragraphs of the Constitution, de-
claring that the general government shall have, and that the particular ones
shall not have, the rights of war and treaty, are so explicit that no commentary
159. Letter from Henry Knox to Israel Chapin, Apr. 28, 1792, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDI-
AN AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 231, 232.
16o. Letter from Henry Knox to William Blount (Aug. 27, 1790), Northwest Territory Collec-
tion, M367, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Ind., http://images.indianahistory.org
/cdm/compoundobject/collection/ONWT/id/51o/rec/2 [http://perma.cc/R4CF-7L5R].
161. Letter from Henry Knox, Sec'y of War, to the Governor of Ga. (Aug. 31, 1792), in 1 AMEn-
CAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 258, 259 ("[Y]our Excellency will easily
discover what is the duty of the federal and your own Government. The constitution has
been freely adopted; the regulation of our Indian connexion is submitted to Congress; and
the treaties are parts of the supreme law of the land.").
162. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Knox (Aug. 1O, 1791), in 22 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 27, 27 (Charles T. Cullen et al. eds., 1986) (arguing that "neither under
the present Constitution nor the antient Confederation had any State or person a right to
Treat with the Indians without the consent of the General Government"); Letter from Ed-
mund Randolph to George Washington, supra note 156, at 273 (arguing for an aggressive
federal role in Indian affairs to the exclusion of the states).
163. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (Jan. 4, 1790), in 4 TiH PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 529, 534-35 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1993).
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can explain them further, nor can any explain them away," he insisted, rebuff-
ing Georgia's effort to sell Indian-owned land.'6 4
The Washington Administration's adoption of a position aggrandizing its
authority is, perhaps, unsurprising. More unexpected is the agreement of state
officials. Shortly after ratification, South Carolina Governor Charles Pinckney
appealed to Washington for assistance from "the general Government, to
whom with great propriety the sole management of India[n] affairs is now
committed.' 6' Georgia's legislature made a similar concession when it rejected
the Governor's call for negotiations with the Creeks. "With the organization of
the foederal government," the legislature wrote, "the power of making war and
peace - raising and supporting armies - providing for the common defence and
general welfare of the United States - entering into Treaties - and regulating
commerce with the Indian tribes was vested in Congress." 66 When the Virgin-
ia legislature supplied Indians with ammunition, it made sure President Wash-
ington knew it had acted from exigency alone, "le[]st in case of silence it might
be interpreted into a design of passing the limits of state authority." 6 7
This holistic reading of the Constitution makes the Indian Trade and Inter-
course Act of 1790 more intelligible. One of Congress's first acts, the law estab-
lished a licensing scheme for Indian traders, barred treaty-making with tribes
without federal approval, and extended state laws over whites traveling into
Indian country. 68 Subsequent revisions added still more provisions. 169 Propo-
nents of an expansive federal commerce power have cited the law's breadth,
particularly its criminal provisions, as evidence of the broad meaning of com-
merce, while opponents have argued that other constitutional authority sup-
ported the law. 170 But searching for a single source of constitutional authority
164. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on Certain Georgia Land Grants (May 3, 1790), in 16 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 406,407 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1961).
165. Letter from Charles Pinckney to George Washington (Dec. 14, 1789), in 4 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 163, at 401, 404.
166. Letter from the Georgia House of Representatives to Governor Edward Telfair (June lo,
1790), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: DEL-
AWARE, NEW JERSEY, GEORGIA AND CONNECTICUT microfilm supp. no. 59, doc. 50 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1978).
167. VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH OF VIRGINIA 7-8, 17.
168. Act ofJuly 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; see also supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
169. See Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of
Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of Mar. 30, 18o2, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139.
17o. Jack Balkin and Akhil Amar have cited the Act's criminal provisions as demonstrating a
comprehensive definition of "commerce." AMAR, supra note 61, at 1o8; Balkin, supra note 61,
at 24-25; cf Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional In-
terpretation, 11S YAIE L.J. 1997, 2004 n.25 (20o6) (noting that the "Indian Intercourse Act of
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asks the wrong question. The law codified a hodgepodge of federal powers,
some intended to protect the federal treaty power, others related to trade. Ra-
ther than adopting a clause-bound approach, the executive officials who draft-
ed the law, and the congressmen who enacted it with little debate, seemingly
shared the view that Congress's "Indian affairs" power emerged from aggre-
gate constitutional provisions.'71
Both during and after ratification, then, much of the nation's political elite
shared an interpretation of Indian relations in which the Indian Commerce
Clause played a minor role. Rather than relying on the Clause in isolation,
members of this elite class argued that the Constitution prohibited the exercise
of state authority by granting the federal government the core Indian affairs
powers in multiple provisions, and by barring the states from entering treaties
or declaring war. In short, they understood federal supremacy against states as
roughly analogous to present-day concepts of field preemption: that is, the
federal government constitutionally occupied the "field" of Indian affairs so
completely as to preclude all state authority.
This executive constitutional understanding from the 1790s shaped the
Supreme Court's earliest pronouncements on Indian law decades after ratifica-
1790 ... plainly regulated noneconomic intercourse with Indian tribes"). By contrast, Rob-
ert Natelson has argued that this provision was an exercise of the Treaty Power codifying
the Treaties of Hopewell. Natelson, supra note 14, at 250-56; Robert G. Natelson & David
Kopel, Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REv. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 55, 59-60 (2010).
Both readings are problematic. Although Congress did not state which power it exer-
cised in enacting the law, some provisions- in particular, the bar on state treaty-making-
clearly reflected powers other than the Indian Commerce Clause. But Natelson's counterar-
gument is highly unpersuasive. The law had its origins in the executive department's com-
mitment to protect the lands of all Natives, not just those who signed the Treaty of
Hopewell. See Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (July 7, 1789), in 3 PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 134, 137-38 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1989) ("It
would reflect honor on the new government and be attended with happy effects were a de-
clarative Law to be passed that the Indian tribes possess the right of the soil of all lands
within their limits respectively and that they are not to be divested thereof but in conse-
quence of fair and bona fide purchasses, made under the authority, or with the express ap-
probation of the United States."). Moreover, Natelson's reading oddly suggests that Con-
gress believed it could convert a provision in treaties with three tribes into a universal grant
of authority. Were this true, of course, the limits Natelson urges on federal power over Indi-
an affairs would be entirely meaningless. A far better reading is that Congress read those
treaty provisions to reflect its power over Indian affairs rather than vice versa-an unsur-
prising position when many Indian treaties contained very similar provisions and followed a
standard template.
171. See S DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, MARCH 4,1789-MARCH 3,1791, at 988-97 (Linda Grant DePauw et al. eds., 1986);
13 id. at 977-82. The brief debate over the law focused on issues of personnel and funding.
The criminal jurisdiction provisions went undebated.
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tion. In 1832, in Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall endorsed federal
supremacy over Indian affairs against Georgia's attempt to assert jurisdiction
over the Cherokee Nation. 172 He traced the contentious history of Article IX of
the Articles of Confederation before noting that the Court need not resolve the
provision's ambiguities.' 7 "The correct exposition of this article is rendered
unnecessary by the adoption of our existing constitution," he wrote. "That in-
strument confers on congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties,
and of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for the
regulation of our intercourse with the Indians." 74
Chief Justice Marshall's endorsement of the preemptive interpretation of
federal authority echoed Henry Knox's views from forty years earlier. Yet the
Chief Justice placed greater emphasis on the Indian Commerce Clause than
earlier thinkers, who all but ignored the provision. As this shift reflected, the
earlier strain of constitutional thought persisted, yet the jurisprudential land-
scape had changed- thanks largely to federal supremacy's opponents.
2. The Argument from State Sovereignty
The embrace of federal supremacy over Indian affairs was not universal,
and heated debates persisted after ratification. But like proponents of federal
authority, expansionist states advanced arguments based on constitutional
structure, not the Indian Commerce Clause. Only later did textual arguments
rooted in the Clause emerge.
Following ratification, advocates for state authority over Indian affairs
adopted different tactics to resist federal supremacy. New York simply ignored
the restrictions on its authority. Throughout the 179os, the state successfully
badgered Natives to enter into a series of dubious land transactions, openly
flouting the Constitution and the Trade and Intercourse Act. 175 Georgia's ap-
proach reflected a more fully articulated theory of state authority. Georgia's re-
sistance began soon after ratification, when the first federal treaty ratified un-
der the Constitution, the 179o Treaty of New York with the Creek nation,
172. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
173. Id. at 558-59.
174. Id. at 559.
175. For the history of New York land transactions in the 1790s, see generally LAURENCE M.
HAUPTMAN, CONSPIRACY OF INTERESTS: IROQUOIS DISPOSSESSION AND THE RISE OF NEW
YORK STATE 58-97 (1999); and TAYLOR,, supra note 102. New York's questionable land
transactions became the subject of extensive litigation in the twentieth century, twice reach-
ing the U.S. Supreme Court. Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985);
Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
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invalidated two earlier cessions that Georgia claimed the Creeks had made to
the state."76 Georgians were outraged. State newspapers denounced the trea-
ty.'7 Federal grand jury presentments attacked the treaty three times, decrying
federal involvement "as the greatest grievance the State of Georgia (as a mem-
ber of the Union) can lay under.' ' 178 State militia threatened to kill all Indians
despite the treaty's promise of federal protection. 179 "[T]he Executive officers
of the Federal Government wished that the Indians might destroy the whole
State of Georgia," raged one militia leader.s "Congress are a set of rascals, and
the Secretary of War an enemy to his country"; the militia leader wished "he
[c]ould drown them in the sea. ',s
Throughout the 179os, Georgia's leaders fashioned a constitutional argu-
ment from this populist rage. They did not challenge the federal right to enter
Indian treaties, but they insisted that the Treaty of New York's guarantee of
Creek title to lands within Georgia, as well as federal commissioners' authority
within the state, was unconstitutional. 82 They invoked various provisions to
ground these objections. Georgia Congressman James Jackson argued that the
protection of Creek land "controverted the plainest principles of the Constitu-
tion, particularly those parts which secured to every citizen the rights of prop-
erty"; he similarly claimed that Article IV, Section 3-which promised that
nothing in the Constitution would prejudice state territorial claims-
guaranteed state territory.' Others insisted that Indian cessions to the federal
government for trading posts within Georgia's boundaries violated the Enclave
Clause, which required state consent for "needful buildings" within state bor-
176. Treaty of New York, supra note 96, art. IV. During the 178os, Georgia concluded the Trea-
ties of Augusta and Galphinton with the Creeks; the two treaties, which the Creeks claimed
were coerced from a handful of representatives without authority, purported to grant large
portions of Creek territory to Georgia. HORSMAN, supra note 113, at 26-30.
177. David A. Nichols, Land, Republicanism, and Indians: Power and Policy in Early National Geor-
gia, 1780-1825, 85 GA. HIST. q. 199, 215-16 (2OOl).
178. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-18OO: THE
JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT, 1790-1794, at 224, 333, 366-67 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988).
179. Report of Fred'k Dalcho, Surgeon's Mate in the Legion of the United States (Sept. 25, 1793),
in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 414.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. E.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1793 (1790).
183. Id. Jackson stressed that treaties "ceded away without any compensation" over "three mil-
lions of acres of land, the property of the State of Georgia, guarantied to that State by the
Constitution of the United States." Id.
1046
124:1012 2015
BEYOND THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE
ders .8' Georgian representatives even denounced licenses required to attend
federal treaty negotiations with Natives, declaring, "We know of no power on
earth, competent to hinder a citizen of Georgia... from exercising the locomo-
tive faculty, within the limits of the State, in the most liberal extent.' ' ,s In 1795,
Georgia defied the Treaty of New York by selling its western territory, includ-
ing federally guaranteed Creek land, to land companies.186 Stressing that the
Constitution enshrined the Treaty of Paris, barred ex post facto laws, and
guaranteed state territory, the legislature insisted that "Georgia ... is in full
possession, and in the full exercise of the jurisdiction and territorial right" over
its territory, and therefore "the right of disposing thereof, is, and are [sic]
hereby declared to be in the State of Georgia only."'
8
,
Federal officials found such assertions "extravagant and absurd," 188 and
Georgians' promiscuous interpretations suggest that they were grasping after
arguments to bolster self-interested claims. Yet Georgians' sense of grievance
was sincere. The Georgians were straining to constitutionalize the sanctity of
state sovereignty and authority over state territory-which is why Georgians
bemoaned the "honor" and "dignity" of their state being "insulted" when fed-
eral officials challenged state jurisdiction. 189
Georgians were the most extreme proponents of state territorial sovereign-
ty, but others held similar views. "[I]f the State territorial Right is not Sover-
eign & Supreme, & exclusively so," Patrick Henry observed, denouncing the
Treaty of New York, "it must follow that some other Power does possess that
exclusive Sovereignty: and every Title not derived from that other Power must
be defective." 9' Even the Governor of Pennsylvania- generally supportive of
184. Protest of the Commissioners of the State of Georgia, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 613-14 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17).
185. Letter from James Hendricks to the Comm'rs of the United States (May 31, 1796), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 591.
186. Act of Jan. 7, 1795, 1795 Ga. Laws 3.
187. Id. § 1. The controversy over this sale culminated in the Supreme Court case of Fletcher v.
Peck, 1O U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (181o).
188. The Commissioners of the United States, Report from the Washington Administration to
the Senate, The Creeks and the Seven Nations (Jan. 4, 1797), in 1 AMERcAN STATE PAPERS:
INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 591.
189. Letter from James Hendricks to the Comm'rs of the United States, supra note 185, at 591;
Protest of the Commissioners of the State of Georgia, supra note 184, at 613-14. The Geor-
gian commissioners repeatedly spoke of the "civil and actual jurisdictional rights of the
State," id. at 613, and of their rights "within the limits, and under the actual jurisdiction of
the State of Georgia," Letter from James Hendricks to the Comm'rs of the United States, su-
pra note 185, at 591.
19o. Letter from Patrick Henry to Edward Telfair, Governor of Georgia (Oct. 14, 1790), in 2 WIL-
LIAM WIRT HENRY, PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 507, 507 (1891);
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federal authority over Indian affairs-rejected a federal appeal to limit settle-
ment in western Pennsylvania. "The Constitutional supremacy of the Laws of
the Union will not be disputed," he wrote President Washington, "but may it
not be Asked ... what power there is to pass a Law which cou'd controul the
Commonwealth in the legitimate exercise of her Territorial jurisdiction?"''
In their arguments against federal authority, state advocates rarely men-
tioned the Indian Commerce Clause.' 92 This was partly because early struggles
over federalism centered on Indian treaties. But silence on the Indian Com-
merce Clause owed more to the fact that states' assertions of territorial sover-
eignty were fundamentally structural, not textual. Even as states cited constitu-
tional snippets, the argument for state authority ultimately rested on an
understanding of federalism that privileged states' sovereignty within their
borders. This argument perpetuated pre-constitutional debates over the ap-
propriate division of authority and reflected the unsettled nature of federalism
in the early Republic. '93
The backward-looking nature of states' arguments, however, blunted their
effectiveness. The Georgians' attempts to shoehorn their views on state sover-
eignty into the Constitution fit imperfectly with the constitutional text. The
Constitution, under any reasonable interpretation, granted the federal gov-
ernment considerable power over Indian affairs, and absolute state territorial
sovereignty was inconsistent with a national government founded in the people
see also Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Walker (Nov. 12, 1790), in HENRY, supra, at
508, 509-10 (arguing the federal government was treating Georgia as "conquered").
191. Letter from Thomas Mifflin, Governor of Pa., to George Washington (June 14, 1794), in 16
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 227, 230-31 (David R. Hoth &
Carol S. Ebel eds., 2011).
192. In my examination of late eighteenth-century documents, I have found only one instance in
which Georgians cited the Indian Commerce Clause, in a newspaper report of a speech by
Governor Telfair challenging the Treaty of New York and the Trade and Intercourse Act.
See Extract from the Address of Governor Telfair, to the Legislature of Georgia, AM. APOLLO
(Bos.), Oct. 5, 1792, at 24-26. Telfair's speech presented an interesting amalgam of claims.
Interpreting the Indian Commerce Clause, he construed commerce broadly, noting that
.trade and intercourse with Indian tribes, have at all times been considered the great ties by
which amity and friendship are secured." Id. at 25. He nonetheless argued that the federal
bar on land purchases from Indians is "an extension beyond the line of commerce," but then
switched to attack the law on the ground that "it is incontrovertible, that the consent of a
State is necessary to establish a right to any part of its territory." Id. at 26. He also insisted
that the Treaty of New York would "subvert every future claim of this State to her territo-
ry." Id. at 25. Telfair's speech thus indicates that, although textual readings of the Indian
Commerce Clause appeared during this period, arguments from territorial sovereignty were
paramount.
193. On the connections between prerevolutionary federalism and subsequent efforts to divide
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and able to act directly, rather than through the states. When Georgians insist-
ed that they had not been represented at the Treaty of New York,194 for in-
stance, federal officials observed that Georgia's Senators had been present
when the treaty was debated.'95 Though the Senators had voted against it, the
Constitution made the treaty supreme law nonetheless.
Confronted with these limitations, states asserting control over Indian af-
fairs in derogation of federal authority shifted their contentions. By the early
nineteenth century, states, though still arguing from territorial sovereignty, al-
so began to insist that the Indian Commerce Clause, interpreted to relate to
trade alone, was the sole basis of federal authority- a move consistent with the
rise of a Supreme Court jurisprudence focused on discrete constitutional claus-
es.19 6 In 1814, a federal Indian agent complained of "[t]he policy of Governor
Mitchell [of Georgia], claiming and exercising an interference in the manage-
ment of Indian affairs, allowing the General Government the regulation of
their commerce only."197 This Indian Commerce Clause-based interpretation
coincided with the rise, beginning in the 181os and culminating in the 1830s, of
aggressive state assertions of sovereignty over Native nations.9 s State demands
that Natives be removed westward gave new salience to questions about the
respective scope of federal and state authority over Indian affairs. To resolve
these issues, the New York, Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee Supreme Courts
all embraced the narrow focus on the Indian Commerce Clause, sweeping all
non-commercial Indian affairs, and even "internal" Indian commerce, within
state jurisdiction.' 99 This restrictive reading also prevailed in a federal circuit
194. The Commissioners of the United States, supra note 188, at 597.
195. Id.
196. See G. EDwARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE: 1815-1835, at 8-9
(abr. ed. 1988) (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall used a linguistic analysis); c JEFFERSON
POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCEBOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL His-
TORY 3-11 (1991) (describing the interplay between textual and extratextual constitutional
arguments from 1791 to 1818). Thanks to Jessica Lowe for this citation.
197. Letter from Benjamin Hawkins to General Armstrong, Sec'y of War (June 7, 1814), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 858.
198. See, e.g., LISA FORD, SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN
AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA, 1788-1836, at 130 (2010) ("Sovereignty talk and jurisdictional prac-
tice changed in Georgia between 1815 and 1830 .... [T]he state bent all of its efforts toward
ending a century of (increasingly contentious) plural practice in Georgia's Indian Coun-
try.").
199. Caldwell v. State, 1 Stew. & P. 327, 330-31 (Ala. 1832); State v. Tassels, 1 Dud. 229, 232-34
(Ga. Super. Ct. 1830); Murray v. Wooden, 17 Wend. 531, 537-38 (N.Y. 1837); State v. Fore-
man, 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 256, 316-19 (1835). For discussion of these and similar cases, see TIM
ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS (2002); ROSEN, supra note 98, at 57-67.
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decision invalidating the Trade and Intercourse Act's criminal jurisdiction pro-
vision." This rewritten constitutional jurisprudence, based on a clause-bound
interpretation of the Constitution, provided states with their most powerful
counterargument to the Washington Administration's nationalist vision. It also
served, in one scholar's words, as a "legal ideology of removal," intended to
forestall interference in state efforts to dispossess Natives within their bor-
ders.2"1
In the end, proponents of state authority lost the doctrinal struggle: in
1832, when the Supreme Court ruled on the federalism issues raised by removal
in Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall enshrined federal supremacy
over Indian affairs. 2 This impeded states little, as they removed Natives, the
Court's holding notwithstanding. °3 But beyond this policy victory, advocates
for state sovereignty arguably won the jurisprudential battle over the methods
of constitutional interpretation, too. Their assertion that the Indian Commerce
Clause was the only basis for federal power over Indian affairs had little rela-
tionship to constitutional understandings during and after ratification. But as
treaty-making declined, Indian warfare moved westward into federal territo-
ries, and Natives had largely been dispossessed of their lands, the older sources
of constitutional authority over Indian affairs faded in importance, and the nar-
row focus on the Indian Commerce Clause prevailed. The Clause was trans-
formed from a minor component of a broad Indian affairs power resting on
multiple provisions into the most important and often sole source of national
authority over Natives.
D. Implications
As the history underscores, the revisionists are right: despite the Supreme
Court's assertions, the Indian Commerce Clause alone cannot justify exclusive
federal power over Indian affairs. The revisionists err, though, when they pro-
ject their textualism onto the historical silence surrounding the Indian Com-
merce Clause. The interpretation with the best claim to be the original under-
standing of the federal Indian affairs power was based on a structural
interpretation of the Constitution; it read multiple provisions in tandem to
•oo. United States v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. 937 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1834).
2ol. GARRISON, supra note 199, at 5-ii.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 172-174.
203. The literature on removal is large. For an overview, see GARRISON, supra note 199. See also,
e.g., MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE POLITICS OF INDIAN REMOVAL: CREEK GOVERNMENT AND SO-
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preclude state authority over Indian affairs. Textualist interpretations focused
on the Indian Commerce Clause were a later innovation derived from a results-
oriented effort to reinterpret the Constitution to cabin federal authority. The
current inconsistency between the federal government's broad and exclusive
authority and the Indian Commerce Clause is thus manufactured. As the props
that once supported exclusive federal power have been knocked out, only a sin-
gle slender pillar survives to support the edifice.
In certain respects, the "original understanding" of exclusive federal power
over Indian affairs provides more robust support for current law. Both Con-
gress and the Court at least gesture toward "other constitutional authority" -
before reverting to the Indian Commerce Clause -to support exclusive federal
authority over Indian affairs.2"4 But as Justice Thomas points out, these half-
hearted and vague invocations are "not illuminating." °s This constitutional de-
fense need not be so thin and unpersuasive. Many constitutional provisions in-
tended to preclude state involvement in Indian affairs, particularly restrictions
on state treaty-making and war powers,2o6 go unmentioned in the Court's de-
cisions. 7 More substantially, as long as the Court constructs its arguments
within the clause-bound framework concocted by federal power's opponents,
its case law will rest on an unpersuasive repetition of precedent-a weak re-
sponse to the revisionists' seeming intellectual courage to question hoary doc-
trines.
But this history also suggests revisiting current law. Adherence to the early
understanding of federal power would limit states more than current doctrine
does, since the Court currently favors conflict rather than field preemption in
analyzing Indian affairs. ° 8 There are policy reasons why strict adherence to
204. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2567 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
25 U.S.C. § 19o1(1)); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-02 (2004) (citing, besides the
Indian Commerce Clause, the Treaty Clause and "preconstitutional powers" to support fed-
eral plenary power).
2o5. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2567 (Thomas, J., concurring).
2o6. See, e.g., Jefferson, supra note 164, at 407 (citing various constitutional provisions, including
Article I, Section io of the United States Constitution, in the context of Jefferson's desire to
secure exclusive power over Indian relations for the federal government, and arguing that
Georgia's actions were unconstitutional).
207. For instance, the Court has never cited Article I, Section io of the United States Constitu-
tion, which restricts state treaty power and the power to keep troops, in any Indian-law de-
cision.
2os. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) ("State jurisdiction is
preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and
tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are sufficient to jus-
tify the assertion of State authority."); cf. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411
U.S. 164, 172 (1973) ("[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sover-
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state exclusion from Indian country may prove too constraining in the present,
as some states and tribes seek to cooperate rather than contend for authority. 9
But the background principle that motivated federal constitutional supremacy
over Indian affairs - the concern that states' attempts to assert jurisdiction over
Native nations were legally dubious and would lead to conflict -has been vin-
dicated by American history, and it deserves more robust consideration than
recent cases have afforded.
Finally, though Indian law is often regarded as sui generis, there is con-
vincing evidence that the Washington Administration's holistic approach to the
constitutional law of Indian affairs also extended to other fields of law. Other
scholars have found a similar conception in early constitutional thinking about
foreign affairs, for instance." ' Recovering the original understanding of Indian
affairs suggests that many inquiries about the Constitution's historical mean-
ing start with unhelpful and ahistorical presumptions. Strict adherence to tex-
tualism and fixation on enumerated powers may sometimes obscure rather
than illuminate original understandings of the Constitution.
eignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption."). Despite
the Court's claim that it applies conflict preemption, though, some of its precedent seems to
reflect a field preemption approach. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 379-80
(1976) ("These States lack jurisdiction to prosecute Indians for most offenses committed on
Indian reservations or other Indian country, with limited exceptions." (quoting H.R. REp.
No. 83-848, at S-6 (1953))). Nonetheless, in certain key Indian-law cases, particularly tax
cases, a field preemptive approach would have likely yielded a different outcome. See Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
2o9. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the "Deadliest Enemies" Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43
TULSA L. Rav. 73 (2007) (arguing that the assumptions underlying the exclusion of states
from Indian affairs at the time of the Constitution's drafting should no longer apply).
21o. See, e.g., Andrew Kent, The New Originalism in Constitutional Law: The New Originalism and
the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 757, 778-79 (2013) ("[T]he Constitution
was understood by some to have granted more foreign relations and national defense pow-
ers to the federal government than parsing the strict semantic or linguistic meaning of its
words would seem to convey .... [Some Federalists believed] that the vesting of foreign af-
fairs and national defense powers in the national government had been so complete and ex-
haustive that unmentioned powers of that nature that served the same purposes could be
considered impliedly granted. This implication arose perhaps from the overall structure and
purposes of the document ...."). Other scholars have found that early American judicial
decisions rarely relied on textualism as a primary interpretive method. William Michael
Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 983, 986-98 (2009); see also AMAR, supra
note 29, at 5-6 (emphasizing the shortcomings of "clause-bound literalism" in interpreting
many constitutional provisions, which must be read "holistically").
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III. PLENARY FEDERAL POWER
As murky as the Indian Commerce Clause's implications for federalism are,
the historical problems presented by the doctrine of plenary power- the doc-
trine that the federal government has complete authority over Indian tribes, in-
cluding their internal affairs - are still more substantial. The Supreme Court
routinely invokes the Clause to justify plenary power," but this assertion does
not find support either in text2 or in any discussion of tribes' constitutional
status in the Clause's sparse drafting and adoption history."3
This disjuncture between doctrine and evidence has not troubled the
Court." 4 But scholars-both Indian law specialists and originalists -have
agreed on a narrative at odds with current law. The Constitution's drafters,
they argue, understood Native nations as separate sovereigns, with whom rela-
tions would be negotiated through diplomacy."' A nineteenth-century innova-
tion, plenary power was born of extra-constitutional powers "inherent in sov-
ereignty" as well as historical necessity, as Natives did not assimilate or
vanish."6
211. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (citing Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99,
103 (1993); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71
(1979)). But see id. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I cannot agree with the Court... that
the Constitution grants to Congress plenary power to calibrate the 'metes and bounds of
tribal sovereignty.' ... I cannot locate such congressional authority in... the Indian Com-
merce Clause." (quoting id. at 2o2 (opinion of the Court))).
212. Numerous scholars have advanced this argument. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 13.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
214. See, e.g., Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 ("This Court has traditionally identified the Indian Com-
merce Clause... and the Treaty Clause.. . as sources of that [plenary and exclusive] pow-
er." (citations omitted)); Prakash, supra note 14, at 1o81 ("[T]he majority in United States v.
Lara was content to merely reiterate the existing (and unedifying) textual arguments for
plenary power.").
ziS. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 13, at 147 ("At the time the Constitution of the United States
was drafted, the Framers generally accepted the notion that the Indian tribes constituted
separate sovereign peoples who were totally self-governing within their territory .... ");
Newton, supra note 28, at 200 ("The absence of a general power over Indian affairs in the
Constitution is not surprising to students of history, for at the time the Constitution was
drafted, the framers regarded Indian tribes as sovereign nations .... "); Prakash, supra note
14, at 1o82 ("[T]he Founders regarded Indian tribes as sovereign nations, with the ability to
make war, treaties, and laws for their own people.").
z 6. This perspective appears in, for example, Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty:
Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Af-
fairs, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1, 54-63 (2002); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power,
82 TUL. L. REV 509, 555-60 (2007); Newton, supra note 28, at 212-16; Prakash, supra note 14,
at 1077-79.
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This Part questions both current doctrine and the scholarly counternarra-
tive regarding plenary power and its origins. Part III.A observes that, contrary
to most scholarly accounts, the United States initially asserted power over In-
dians aggressively, but the Constitution and the Washington Administration
rejected this approach. Nonetheless, the new federal government did not re-
gard Native nations as fully sovereign. Part III.B explores the Washington
Administration's construction of theories of U.S. sovereignty over Native na-
tions, theories grounded in constitutional readings of international law and ter-
ritoriality. Federal officials believed that the authority they claimed-limits on
Natives' international legal personality, including their right to freely alienate
land -only modestly restricted Native sovereignty, yet in practice these limita-
tions evolved into the doctrine of plenary power. Part III.C explores the doctri-
nal implications of this history, suggesting that recovering the United States'
original assertions of sovereignty over Native nations might suggest cabining
plenary power.
A. The Indian Commerce Clause and Power over Indian Tribes
History both complicates and supports critiques of the plenary-power in-
terpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause. Though the Clause says little
about power over Natives, it was drafted as the United States was repudiating
a failed effort to aggressively assert authority against Native nations, particu-
larly their lands. In this context, the Clause is best read as part of a broader re-
turn to diplomatic models for negotiating with Natives as independent polities.
The frequent assertion that early Americans regarded Indian tribes as sepa-
rate sovereigns outside U.S. jurisdiction is too simplistic. For one, "tributary"
Natives-eastern tribes surrounded by Anglo-American communities -were
subject to state law. 17 Likely the "members of the States" under Article IX of
217. The application of colonial regulations and civil and criminal jurisdiction to Natives in Mas-
sachusetts is considered in YASUHIDE KAWASHIMA, PURITAN JUSTICE AND THE INDIAN:
WHITE MAN'S LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1630-1763 (1986). For additional background, see
DANIEL R. MANDELL, BEHIND THE FRONTIER: INDIANS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY EASTERN
MASSACHUSETTS (1996); and DAVID J. SILVERMAN, FAITH AND BOUNDARIES: COLONISTS,
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the Articles' 8 these Natives were presumably also the "taxed" Indians implied
in the Constitution.2
9
Early American constitutional thinking focused, though, on the western
nations who "encircle[d] the Union from Maine to Georgia"" -the Creeks,
the Cherokees, the Haudenosaunee, and the tribes of the Ohio country, among
others. The Revolutionary War profoundly affected these nations. The war,
begun partly due to Anglo-Americans' desire for Native land, spread into Indi-
an country, where it became a chaotic contest between Anglo-American settlers
and largely British-allied tribes, resulting in a deep-seated hatred of Indians."'
These fruits of war ensured that respect for Natives was not the hallmark of
post-Revolutionary Indian policy. During debates over the Articles' drafting,
congressional delegate James Wilson had urged, "We have no right over the
Indians, whether within or without the real or pretended limits of any Colo-
ny."' Wilson, however, was ignored. After the war, the states and the federal
government insisted that Natives were no longer "free and independent na-
tion[s]" but a "subdued people.""3
The claim rested on the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which ended the war with
Britain and granted most British territory east of the Mississippi to the United
States.' The transfer of this vast territory-extending far beyond existing set-
tlement or effective federal and state authority -had dramatic consequences for
Natives. Under Anglo-American readings of the treaty, Native nations were
218. See 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 36, at lo77-78 (recording Brax-
ton's argument for excluding Indians who "are tributary to any State" from federal jurisdic-
tion); see also Clinton, supra note 54, at 1140-41 (arguing that only Indians who "had become
subject to state law and oversight.., prior to the Revolution" were included within state ju-
risdiction under the Articles).
219. See Fletcher, supra note 216, at 555-60 (suggesting that the "taxed" Indians encompassed as-
similated, nontribal Indians).
220. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 163 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
221. Explorations of the role of Indians in the American Revolution can be found in COLIN G.
CALLOwAY, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY: CRISIS AND DIVERSITY IN NA-
TIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (1995). The rise of hatred of Indians is the central theme in
PETER RHOADS SILVER, OUR SAVAGE NEIGHBORS: How INDIAN WAR TRANSFORMED EARLY
AMERICA (2008). See also PATRICK GRIFFIN, AMERICAN LEVIATHAN: EMPIRE, NATION, AND
REVOLUTIONARY FRONTIER (2007); RICHTER, supra note 86, at 189-236.
222. 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 36, at 1078.
223. Proceedings of the United States and the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix, in 18 EARLY AMERI-
CAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note lo5, at 313, 323-24.
224. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 683-94 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1922). On the Treaty's consequences for Natives, see FREDERICK E. HOXIE, THIS INDIAN
COUNTRY: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND THE PLACE THEY MADE 23-36 (2012).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
not "external."' s Instead, Native nations within the new borders- even those
that had barely interacted with Anglo-Americans -were now ostensibly part of
the United States. Expansionist states labeled Indians within their capacious
borders 6 as state "[m]embers," prefiguring efforts to subordinate tribes to
state jurisdiction. 7 Federal officials demanded that tribes "acknowledge the
United States to be the sole and absolute sovereigns of all the territory ceded to
them by a treaty of peace, made between them and the King of Great Brit-
ain.''8 Moreover, abandoning earlier practices of purchase, both the state and
federal governments now claimed Native land by right of conquest; some
states took Indian title through ordinary legislation.' 9
These claims to U.S. authority through conquest were expansive, but they
were distinct from later concepts of plenary power. Both the states and the fed-
eral government focused almost entirely on obtaining land and had little inter-
est in regulating Indians' internal affairs.23° Anglo-Americans' principal preoc-
cupation remained delineating sovereignty and authority among themselves,
refracting nearly all issues involving Indians through the lens of federalism.23'
Assertions that were ostensibly about Native status - the claims that Indians
were state "members," for instance -were actually intended to forestall federal
interference in state land grabs. 32 Even treaty language granting Congress the
power "to manage all [the Indians'] affairs in such manner as they think prop-
225. Matthew Fletcher suggests the existence of this category of "external" Indian nations.
Fletcher, supra note 216, at 555-60. The confusion arises from Madison's proposal at the
Convention that Congress possess power over Indians "within [and] without the limits of
the U[nited] States." See supra text accompanying note 41. Madison was not referring to
control of Indians outside U.S. boundaries, an authority the United States specifically dis-
claimed. See Treaty of Canandaigua, U.S.-Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44, 44-46 (lim-
iting the scope of the treaty to Natives "within the boundaries of the United States: For the
United States do not interfere with nations, tribes, or families, of Indians elsewhere resi-
dent"). Instead, Madison was seeking to abrogate Article IX of the Articles of Confederation
by affirming congressional authority within and without state borders.
Z26. Many states maintained extensive western territorial claims based on colonial charters, but
they had mostly ceded those claims to the federal government by 1787. PETER S. ONUF, THE
ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1775-1787, at 149-72 (1983). The last holdout, Georgia, ceded its claims in 18o2.
FORD, supra note 198, at 24-25.
227. See, e.g., James Duane's Views on Indian Negotiations, supra note lO5, at 299; Treaty of
Galphinton, in 18 EARLYAMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note lO5, at 390.
228. Treaty of Fort Finney, U.S.-Shawnee Nation, art. II, Jan. 31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26, 26.
229. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 224, at 683-94; Act of
Apr. 18, 1783, ch. 2, 1783 N.C. Sess. Laws 322, 322-25.
230. Ablavsky, supra note 24, at l18-33.
231. Id.
232. See James Duane's Views on Indian Negotiations, supra note 1O5, at 299.
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er"- later the subject of doctrinal disagreement-was, in context, an effort to
bolster federal authority against states rather than a claim of power over Indian
tribes. 23
3
Nonetheless, even Anglo-Americans' more limited claim to Indian lands
through conquest was a break with earlier practice and a bold assertion of au-
thority over Indian tribes. It was also an arrogant misinterpretation of reality.
As the United States soon discovered, Native nations refused to "submit to be
treated as Dependants."' 3 Insisting that they were not bound by a treaty be-
tween the United States and Britain,23 Indian leaders turned for support to the
neighboring British and Spanish, who were eager to check American expan-
sion.36 Native nations also constructed a "formidable" confederation that
threatened the United States with war.237 In short, regardless of what Anglo-
Americans labeled them, Native nations possessed de facto independence, bely-
ing assertions of conquest.3'
Many Anglo-Americans recognized this mismatch between the authority
the United States claimed and what it could exercise. 39 By the summer of 1787,
233. Treaty of Hopewell, supra note 96, art. LX. The treaty's structure and preamble suggest that
the provision -a near-verbatim quote of Article IX of the Articles of Confederation -was in-
tended to address authority to regulate cross-cultural intercourse, not tribal governance. In
Cherokee Nation, Justice Johnson in dissent argued that the Cherokees had, through this
provision, relinquished "all power, legislative, executive and judicial to the United States."
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 24-25 (1831) (Johnson, J., dissenting). In
Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall offered a more persuasive reading that limited the provi-
sion's scope, though he missed its federalism context. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 518-19 (1832).
234. James Duane's Views on Indian Negotiations, supra note 105, at 299.
235. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander McGillivray to Andrew Pickens (Sept. 5, 1785), in 18 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note lo5, at 387, 388 ("[W]e [Creeks] know our own
limits,... and, as a free nation ... we shall pay no regard to any limits that may prejudice
our claims, that were drawn by an American, and confirmed by a British negotiator.").
236. See James H. Merrell, Declarations of Independence: Indian-White Relations in the New Nation,
in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER AND LIMITS 197, 202 (Jack P. Greene ed.,
1987).
237. Letter from Captain John Doughty to Henry Knox, Sec'y of War (Oct. 21, 1785), in 2 THE
ST. CLAIR PAPERS 9, 10 (William Henry Smith ed., Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1882);
see also Speech of the United Indian Nations to Congress (Dec. 18, 1786), in 18 EARLYAMER-
ICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note loS, at 356, 356-58.
238. See Merrell, supra note 236, at 202-03.
239. Both James Madison and James Monroe, for instance, found New York's assertion that the
Six Nations were state "members" problematic. See, e.g., Letter from James Monroe to
James Madison (Nov. 15, 1784), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 140, 140 (Robert A.
Rutland et al. eds., 1962) (questioning "whether the living simply within the bounds of a
State, in the exclusion only of an European power, while they acknowlidge no obidience to
its laws but hold a country over which they do not extend, nor enjoy the protection nor any
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the disasters of Indian policy under the Articles of Confederation led Congress
to abandon its assertions of conquest.' 40 Now, instead of employing a "lan-
guage of superiority and command," a congressional committee urged the
more "politic and Just" course of "treat[ing] with the Indians ... on a footing
of equality." 1 It also recommended returning to purchasing Indian lands.)4
Read against this history, the Constitution arguably reflected a conscious
choice to place Natives outside the body politic. Most Indians were not counted
for the purposes of congressional representation, a decision at odds with earlier
proposals for possible Native representatives in Congress. 3 Including Indian
tribes within the Commerce Clause was inconsistent with the claim that they
were conquered peoples. Furthermore, the sparse discussions of Natives at the
Convention portrayed them as independent if bellicose nations rather than as
vassals of the United States. 44
It is wrong, then, to assert that the Indian Commerce Clause established
federal plenary power, but it is equally wrong to assert that federal power over
Indian tribes was unknown when the Constitution was drafted. A better read-
ing of history is that the Constitution obliquely endorsed a significant and
simultaneous shift in Anglo-Americans' thought about Natives' status: the re-
pudiation of a theory of Native peoples as conquered in favor of a grudging ac-
knowledgment of Native independence. This recognition had limits, as the fol-
lowing section explores.
of the rights of citizenship within it, is a situation wh. will even in the most qualified sense,
admit their being held as members of a State").
240. See supra Part II.B.2.
241. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 479; see also Merrell, supra
note 236, at 203-04 (discussing the Continental Congress's new course of Indian policy).
242. See 33 JOuRNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 480.
243. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, para. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their re-
spective Numbers, which shall be determined by... excluding Indians not taxed.... ."). For
treaty provisions providing for possible Native representation in Congress, see Treaty of
Hopewell, supra note 96, art. XII, which states, "That the Indians may have full confidence
in the justice of the United States, respecting their interests, they shall have the right to send
a deputy of their choice, whenever they think fit, to Congress"; and Treaty with the Dela-
wares, U.S.-Delaware Nation, art. VI, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13, which states, "[I]t is further
agreed upon between the contracting parties should it for the future be found conductive for
the mutual interest of both parties to invite any other tribes who have been friends to the in-
terest of the United States, to join the present confederation, and to form a state whereof the
Delaware nation shall be the head, and have a representation in Congress ...
244. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48; Ablavsky, supra note 24, at 1038-50.
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B. Native Sovereignty, United States Sovereignty, and the Law of Nations
Few words dominate federal Indian law more than the term "sovereignty."
Though it is not a Native term, Native nations have adopted it to express deep-
ly felt but oft-denied rights of autonomy, while in doctrine "sovereignty" has
become a term of art for adjudicating jurisdictional disputes. 4 '
The central place of sovereignty in Indian law owes much to the Washing-
ton Administration. Embracing law and restraint over claims of conquest, the
Administration drew on the law of nations to determine Native status. As a re-
sult, federal officials framed nearly all issues of Indian affairs, including the
question of land title, through the international law concept of sovereignty.
This focus on the law of nations yielded mixed results for Natives, as this
section explores. In many respects, international law provided a more expan-
sive scope for Native autonomy. But the law of nations could be a sword as
well as a shield, interpreted by Anglo-Americans to limit as well as protect Na-
tive sovereignty. As Part III.B.2 considers, early federal officials used interna-
tional law to claim territorial sovereignty over Natives and the corresponding
right to serve as their sole "protectors" within the borders of the United States.
Part III.B.3 traces federal international-law arguments that the United States
was the sole legal purchaser of Native lands. In both instances, Anglo-
Americans asserted that the restrictions placed on Native sovereignty and inde-
pendence were minor. Natives, however, disagreed, and their assessment
proved more accurate: as Part III.B.4 argues, these early constraints became the
roots of plenary power.
1. The United States and the Law of Nations
The renewed salience of the law of nations and sovereignty in the post-
revolutionary United States stemmed from several sources. First, the American
Revolution made sovereignty central to late eighteenth-century thought about
nationhood.4 6 Sovereignty questions were at the heart of the constitutional
245. See Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Depend-
ent Nation, 83 OR. L. REv. 1109, 1111 (2004) (describing the Court's treatment of sovereignty
as well as the view of tribe members "for whom 'sovereignty' is as common and heartfelt a
term as 'rights' is to most other Americans").
246. For instance, in printed English-language materials digitized by Google Books, the word
.sovereignty" appears nearly nine times more frequently in 1787 than in 174o. Ngram Viewer,
GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/ngrams [http://perma.cc/FXE7-CD8L] (search
"Graph these comma-separated phrases" for "sovereignty"; then follow "Search lots of
books" hyperlink).
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debates about the imperial crisis that culminated in the Revolution, 7 and the
Declaration of Independence represented a bold assertion of self-
sovereignty)4 s But the Revolution also underscored that sovereignty depended
on recognition by the community of nations, leading to deep-seated concern
among Anglo-American elites over the United States' status in international
law. 249
Second, the late eighteenth century was a moment of transition in interna-
tional law. In the 178os and '9os, the law of nations remained an amalgam of
older ideas about natural rights and newer concepts of positive law derived
from treaties and national customs. 2s These sources gave the law of nations a
universalism that it would later lose; the interpretations of the era's foremost
thinkers granted non-European nations international-law rights that they
could invoke against European colonizers.2"' Federal officials shared this uni-
versalist conception. They routinely spoke of the "law of nations" and custom-
ary international law as applying to their relationships with Natives. 2" There
was little doubt to early Americans that international law governed both the
United States and Indian nations as well as their relations.
Finally, the law of nations became increasingly prominent due to the Unit-
ed States' situation in the early 1790s. Anglo-Americans viewed Native nations
as proxies in the struggle for the borderlands with the British in Canada and
247. For background on these debates, see infra notes 337-338 and accompanying text.
248. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). This aspect of the Declaration is ex-
plored in DAviD ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 25-62
(2007).
249. For an exploration of the Revolution and its aftermath as part of the American effort to join
the community of nations, see generally GOULD, supra note 33; and Golove & Hulsebosch,
supra note 29.
2So. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, wrote that "It]he Law of Nations ... is composed of three
branches. i. The Moral law of our nature. 2. The Usages of nations. 3. Their special Conven-
tions." Opinion on the Treaties with France, 28 April 1793, in 25 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 608, 609 (John Catanzariti ed., 1992). On the transition from natural to positive law in
eighteenth-century international law, see STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: A
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 144-213 (2014).
251. See Jennifer Pitts, Empire and Legal Universalisms in the Eighteenth Century, 117 AM. HIST.
REV. 92 (2012).
252. See, e.g., Letter from Gov. St. Clair to the Judges of the Northwestern Territory (Aug. 2,
1788), in 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 273, 275 (Clarence Edward Carter
ed., 1934) ("As to the Natives they are generally under the Protection of the Law of Nations
... ."); Memorial from House of Representatives and Council of the Southwest Territory to
U.S. Congress, Sept. i8, 1794, in 4 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 354-55 n.21
(Clarence Edward Carter ed., 1936) (urging an attack on the Creeks and Cherokees for trea-
ty violations "according to the usage and custom of nations").
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the Spanish in Florida and Louisiana." 3 Federal officials feared, with some jus-
tification, that the British and Spanish supported Native nations as buffers
against U.S. expansion; several times in the early 1790s, this issue became so
heated that both Americans and Europeans spoke of possible war.254 These dis-
putes forced American officials - particularly Secretary of State Thomas Jeffer-
son - to articulate legal theories of Native status that European diplomats
would acknowledge, further encouraging federal officials to frame these ques-
tions using cosmopolitan international-law discourse. s"
There was widespread agreement, then, that the law of nations should gov-
ern relations between the United States and Natives. It was less clear what the
content of that law would be. The members of the Washington Administration
were well versed in the writings of the European publicists, particularly the
works of the influential eighteenth-century international lawyer Emil de Vat-
tel. s6 But the fundamental texts of the eighteenth-century law of nations,
though universalist in aspiration, were Eurocentric in content; they said little
about Native peoples.2 7 The Administration thus faced the challenge of trans-
lating international law principles from Europe to the American borderlands.
Its efforts to do so had lasting consequences for Natives, as the following sec-
tions explore.
2. "[Tihe Species of Sovereignty which the United States claim over the
Indians"
The Washington Administration's emphasis on the law of nations yielded
a more expansive view of Native sovereignty than the United States had con-
ceded under the Articles. Knox insisted that "Indians possess the natural rights
253. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at
112-22 (2009).
254. Id. at 123-38.
255. Cf GOULD, supra note 33, at 180-209 (noting the salience of law of nations arguments over
Natives in disputes with Britain and Spain, albeit in a later period).
z56. On Vattel's influence in early America, see ONUF & ONUF, supra note 33, at lO-19.
257. Cf. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-23 (2d ed. 2004) (de-
scribing Vattel's implications for Natives, but stressing Vattel's European focus). Earlier le-
gal thought, particularly by the Spanish scholar Francisco de Vitoria, had focused on Na-
tives' status under natural law. Id. at 16-19; ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-31 (2005); NEFF, supra note 250, at 107-35. But
this thought seemingly had little effect on early American Indian law. Cf Felix S. Cohen,
The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (1942)
(noting that Vitoria had little direct impact on U.S. law, but arguing for indirect Spanish in-
fluence).
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of man," , obligating the United States to treat them with "justice and human-
ity."259 He also urged repudiating earlier practice under the Articles: "inde-
pendent nations and tribes of indians," he wrote Washington, "ought to be
considered as foreign nations, not as the subjects of any particular state. " 6
Thomas Jefferson went further. In his view, "the Indians had.., full, undivid-
ed and independant sovereignty as long as they chose to keep it and that this
might be for ever."261 One draft of a Jefferson letter to American diplomats
overseas disclaimed power over Indians, "for we pretend to none over a nation
of independent government."2
The Administration's practice largely followed these principles, as it re-
placed claims of conquest with diplomacy. The Administration emphasized
treaties with Native nations, the provisions of which largely disclaimed author-
ity over Natives or their self-governance. 63 Indian country, the Attorney Gen-
eral recognized, lay outside the scope of federal legislative jurisdiction.264 The
successive Trade and Intercourse Acts asserted personal jurisdiction only over
citizens of the United States who ventured into Indian country; 26, one scholar
258. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 163, at 529, 529-35.
259. Henry Knox's Notes on the State of the Frontier, Jan. 1790, in 5 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASH-
INGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 76, 79 (Dorothy Twohig et al. eds., 1996).
260. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 170, at 134-40.
z61. Notes on Cabinet Opinions, 26 February 1793, in 25 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 250, at 271, 272.
262. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael and William Short (June 30, 1793), in
26 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 92, at 405, 417 n.28. The quotation omits the
insertion of the words "an independent" between "over" and "a nation," which was deleted in
the manuscript but restored by the volume's editors. Guide to Editorial Apparatus, in 26 PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 92, at vii.
263. Though post-ratification Indian treaties required tribes to place themselves under federal
protection, these treaties abandoned provisions requiring recognition of federal sovereignty
and replaced them with guarantees of tribal lands and implicit acknowledgments of Native
autonomy. See, e.g., Treaty of Canandaigua, U.S.-Six Nations, Jan. 21, 1795, 7 Stat. 44; Trea-
ty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, Feb. 7, 1792, 7 Stat. 39; Treaty of New
York, supra note 96.
264. Letter from the Att'y Gen. to the Sec'y of the Treasury (June 19, 1795), in 2 TERRITORIAL PA-
PERS OF THE UNITED STATES 520, 520 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1934) ("There can be no
doubt, that all the laws of Congress... are, in their operation coextensive with the Territory
of the United States, and obligatory upon every person therein, except independent Nations
& Tribes of Indians residing on Indian lands . . ").
265. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Star. 139; Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of May
19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329; Act of July 22, 1790, ch.
33, 1 Stat. 137. Not until the final version of the Trade and Intercourse Act in 1834 did the
United States assert criminal jurisdiction over Natives. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 19, 4
Stat. 729, 732 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
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has described the laws as entrenching a system of legal pluralism that acknowl-
edged the persistence of Native jurisdiction. 66
Yet Jefferson's claim that Indians possessed full sovereignty under this new
legal order was disingenuous. The Washington Administration had repudiated
earlier practice by acknowledging aspects of Natives' independence, yet it did
not consider tribes to be fully external nations. Rather, these nations still exist-
ed, as Knox, Washington, and others often wrote, "within the limits of the
United States" - that is, within the borders set by the Treaty of Paris.26 7 Ac-
cording to these officials, this inclusion meant that the United States now pos-
sessed "territorial title" -what we would now call territorial sovereignty- over
Indian country.268 This insistence on territory reflected the era's intellectual
currents. Enshrined in the writing of the influential eighteenth-century inter-
national lawyer Emil de Vattel, the concept of uniform sovereignty over a na-
tional territory with defined borders paralleled the rise of the nation-state and
the repudiation of imperial models in which authority radiated from center to
periphery.269 The logic of territoriality meant that Native sovereignty and U.S.
266. FORD, supra note 198, at 30-42.
267. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (June 15, 1789), in 2 PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 490, 493 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1987) ("The
time has arrived when it is highly expedient, that a liberal system of justice should be adopt-
ed for the various indian tribes within the limits of the United States."); Letter from George
Washington to the Comm'rs to the S. Indians (Aug. 29, 1789), in 3 PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 170, at 551-52, 556 (providing instructions for the commissioners
for concluding treaties "with the independent tribes or nations of Indians within the limits
of the united States, south of the river Ohio," and urging them to conclude a treaty with
"the Creeks who are within the limits of the United States acknowledge themselvs to be un-
der the protection of the united States of America, and of no other sovereign whosoever");
Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Sept. 12, 1791), in 8 PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS 524, 524-26 (Mark A. Mastromarino ed.,
1999) (discussing constitutional authority over negotiations with "Indian tribes, within the
limits of the United States").
z68. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Arthur Campbell (Aug. 28, 1795), Folder 2, Timothy Pick-
ering Papers, Ayers 926, Newberry Library, Chicago, Ill.
z69. Eileen P. Scully, The United States and International Affairs, 1789-1919, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 604, 606-08, 622-26 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tom-
lins eds., 2008). The rise of territorial sovereignty is often associated with the development
of the "Westphalian" state system in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though its
rise both predated and postdated the Treaty of Westphalia. See KAL RAUSTIAIA, DOES THE
CONSTITUTION FOLLOw THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAw
5-43 (2009). See generally STUART ELDEN, THE BIRTH OF TERRITORY (2013) (describing the
development of territory in ancient and medieval thought). An exploration of territorial sov-
ereignty's rise in early America and its effect on Native independence can be found in FORD,
supra note 198. For a consideration of imperial concepts of uneven sovereignty and their en-
durance, see LAUREN A. BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EU-
ROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400-1900 (2010).
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sovereignty coexisted within the same space. The implications were significant,
for this shared sovereignty suggested that Natives did not possess sovereignty
equivalent to that of the United States or Spain or Britain: Euro-American na-
tions could not possess sovereignty over the same territory. Territoriality estab-
lished Native sovereignty as subordinate to the sovereignty of the United
States.
Exactly how U.S. sovereignty limited Native sovereignty was a subject of
considerable discussion, arising first in 1782 during negotiations over the Trea-
ty of Paris.27 With their territorial interests at stake, the Spanish insisted that
"neither Spain nor the United States has any rights of sovereignty over the In-
dians.""' They pressed John Jay, the American envoy, as to how Anglo-
Americans could claim "territories which manifestly belong to free and inde-
pendent nations of Indians."272 Jay replied that these "were points to be dis-
cussed and settled between us and them; that we claimed the right of preemp-
tion with respect to them, and the sovereignty with respect of all other
nations."273
Jay's views were ignored under the Articles, but the Washington Admin-
istration, especially Secretary of State Jefferson, elaborated them into a law of
nations doctrine that the Administration enunciated in border negotiations
with the British and Spanish. The core of this doctrine was that, due to their
inclusion within the United States, Native nations were not free to negotiate or
associate with other Euro-American nations. In Jefferson's words, it was
an established principle of public law among the white nations of
America that while the Indians included within their limits retain all
other natl. rights no other white nation can become their patrons, pro-
tectors or Mediators, nor in any shape intermeddle between them and
those within whose limits they are.274
Or, as one of Jefferson's British interlocutors observed, the Americans did "not
regard[] the Indians living on their respective frontiers or within their respec-
tive territory, as possessing that sort of independent sovereignty which would
270. HoxiE, supra note 224, at 23-36.
271. Letter from Joseph-Matthias Grard de Rayneval to John Jay (Sept. 4, 1782), in 2 JOHN JAY:
THE WINNING OF THE PEACE: UNPUBLISHED PAPERS 1780-1784, at 329, 331 (Richard B. Morris
ed., 198o).
272. Letter from John Jay to Robert Livingston (Nov. 17, 1782), in 6 THE REVOLUTIONARY DIP-
LOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11, 24 (Francis Wharton ed., 1889).
273. Id. On preemption, see infra Part III.B.3.
274. Notes for a Conversation with George Hammond (ca. Dec. 10, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 717, 717 (John Catanzariti ed., 199o).
1o64
124:1012 2015
BEYOND THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE
entitle them to a claim on the intervention of a third power in terminating any
dispute in which they might be involved.""7 Jefferson forcefully announced the
same position to the Spanish during tense negotiations over Spanish patronage
of the Creeks and other southern Indian nations.276
The sole power and duty to protect Native nations was thus the "Species of
Sovereignty which the United States claim over the Indians within their
boundaries in exclusion of every other Sovereign," as Knox's successor Timo-
thy Pickering described it.m As for the source of this sovereignty, Jefferson
stated repeatedly that it was based on "the usages established among the white
nations, with respect to indians living within their several limits", 7s -- a kind of
Jus gentium for America," he termed it, using the era's Latinate term for inter-
national law.279 Echoing the principle articulated by Vattel that states were le-
gally barred from interfering in other states' internal affairs,2o Jefferson insist-
275. Notes of a Conversation with George Hammond (Dec. 12, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 274, at 728, 728 n.
276. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael and William Short (Nov. 3, 1792),
in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 274, at 565, 566 ("[W]e take for granted
that Spain will be ready to agree to the principle that neither party has a right to stipulate
protection or interference with the Indian nations inhabiting the territory of the other.");
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael and William Short (Oct. 14, 1792), in
24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 274, at 479, 479-81. Carmichael and Short
were U.S. commissioners to Spain whom Jefferson instructed at various points to "com-
municate" the Administration's views on Indian affairs "to the Court of Madrid." Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael and William Short (June 30, 1793), in 26
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 92, at 405, 412. According to Jefferson's ac-
count, the Spanish concurred with Jefferson's interpretations. Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to George Washington (Nov. 2,1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
274, at 562, 562 (reporting that the Spanish envoys "did not imagine their government
would think themselves authorized to take under their protection any Nation of Indians, liv-
ing within limits confessed to be ours").
277. Letter from Timothy Pickering to William Blount (Mar. 23, 1795), in 4 THE TERRITORIAL
PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 252, at 386, 387.
278. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael and William Short (May 31, 1793), in
26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 92, at 148, 148. Jay had similarly argued
based on existing usage during the Treaty of Paris negotiations. See Letter from John Jay to
Robert Livingston, supra note 272, at 24 (observing, in response to Spanish questioning of
U.S. sovereignty over Indians, "that Mexico and Peru had been in the same predicament,
and yet that his Catholic majesty had had no doubts of his right to the sovereignty of those
countries").
279. Notes of a Conversation with George Hammond (June 3, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 274, at 26, 30. On the jus gentium, see NEFF, supra note 250,
at 151-66.
280. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 96 (B61a Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds.,
Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758) (emphasizing that internal affairs are "a
national concern" in which "no foreign power has a right to interfere").
io65
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ed on this norm to Britain and Spain; he regarded it as a restriction on Europe-
an states' actions within U.S. boundaries, rather than a limitation on Native
sovereigns."
Yet Anglo-Americans tried to get Indians to acknowledge this principle as
well. Since independence, federal negotiators had included language in treaties
that tribes placed themselves "under the protection of the United States of
America, and of no other sovereign whosoever. " 2 But although many tribes
signed these treaties, others strongly resisted. The Creeks, for instance, "most
positive[ly] refus[ed] to acknowledge the Creek Nation to be within the limits,
or under the Protection of the United States," seeking to maintain their alliance
with the Spanish.2 8 Natives rejected suggestions that authority could be
claimed over them without their consent. "You well know that no sovereignty
was ceded to you at the peace of 1763 [between the Creeks and the British], ex-
cept such lands as was purchased by his Majesty's subjects by solemn treaty,"
Creek leader John Galphin informed encroaching Georgians,8 4 "We actually
see our whole country laid out into districts, without considering us to have
any kind of claim or right, which nature has bestowed on us, and of which op-
pression or prejudice alone can attempt to rob us." ' Yet such protestations
were, as a matter of law, in vain, for Native assent was not necessary to claim
sovereignty; only the customs of "white nations" constituted the law of na-
286tions.
This international law grounding may suggest that the U.S. assertion of
sovereignty over Indian nations was a claim to pre- or extra-constitutional
power, as the Court proposed in dicta in Lara,28 7 and as Fletcher has further
elaborated. 8 8 This is true if "constitutional" authority requires an unambigu-
ous grounding in explicit constitutional text. But Jefferson, Knox, and other
officials would likely not have shared this cramped meaning of constitutional-
ism, for several reasons. First, as scholars have recently emphasized, interna-
281. See supra notes 261-262, 276 and accompanying text.
282. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, supra note 263, art. II; Treaty of New York, supra note 96,
art. II; see also Treaty with the Wyandots, Etc., art. XIII, Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 28 ("[T]o be
under the protection of the said United States, and no other power whatever.").
283. Washington's Memoranda on Indian Affairs (1789), in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHING-
TON, supra note 163, at 468, 472.
284. Letter from John Galphin to Jared Irwin (Aug. 21, 1793), in i AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: IN-
DIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 371, 371.
285. Id.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 274, 278.
287. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).
288. Fletcher, supra note 216.
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tional law norms deeply shaped the U.S. Constitution, even beyond empower-
ing Congress to punish offenses against the "Law of Nations",89: the docu-
ment's purpose was in part to create a sovereign capable of complying with in-
ternational law's requirements.29" Second, it would be misleading to
characterize the concepts of territorial sovereignty underlying claims to author-
ity over Native nations as extra-constitutional. The Constitution established
this sovereignty both in an abstract sense and through specific provisions: the
elevation of the Treaty of Paris and all other treaties to "the supreme Law of the
Land";29 congressional power to admit new states;29' guarantees of state and
federal land claims;293 and perhaps most significantly, the Property Clause,
granting the "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." 94
Therefore, although concepts of territoriality and the law of nations predated
the Constitution, the document became the touchstone for their meaning,
scope, and expression in the post-ratification United States.
In short, the Washington Administration acknowledged considerable Na-
tive autonomy but did not recognize Native nations as the United States'
equals in the community of nations. Instead, the Washington Administration
claimed, by dint of the law of nations, ultimate sovereignty over the territory of
the United States, and it insisted that this sovereignty limited Native power to
ally with foreign nations. Anglo-Americans believed this to be a modest limita-
tion, but, from the Native perspective, the "protection" of the United States
doubtless looked less like a guardian's solicitude than a demand for subordina-
tion. 9s
289. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. io.
290. On the law of nations background to the Constitution, see supra note 33. See also ONUF &
ONUF, supra note 33, at 1o8 ("The Revolutionaries' internationalist commitments converged
with a powerful tendency in American constitutionalism toward natural law principles. The
distinction between foreign and domestic spheres, and therefore between international and
constitutional thought, was not clearly drawn in this period.").
291. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
292. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. I.
293. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
294. Id.
29S. For a discussion of the usage of "protection" as a term of art implying jurisdiction over Na-
tive peoples in late eighteenth-century North America, see Lauren Benton, Shadows of Sover-
eignty: Legal Encounters and the Politics of Protection in the Atlantic World, in ENCOUNTERS:
OLD AND NEW 13-17 (Alan Karras & Laura Mitchell eds., forthcoming 2015).
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3. Sovereignty and Native Land
Nowhere was the Washington Administration's shift from earlier Indian
policy clearer than in its approach to Native lands. As a considerable body of
scholarship has recognized, Indian land ownership was a hotly contested ques-
tion in early American law.296 Yet the Washington Administration repeatedly
emphasized the sanctity of Native tide. To an extent that previous work has
failed to appreciate, the restrictions the Administration claimed over Native
land tenure -most notably its power as sole purchaser -stemmed from an ap-
plication of the same principles of sovereignty and international law with
which the Administration approached Native autonomy.2 97
Self-interest colored all interpretations of Indian land ownership in early
America. Some speculators, having purchased Native land in questionable
transactions, argued that Natives enjoyed absolute title.29s More common was
the insistence that Indians had only a tenuous claim to their lands, formalized
in the assertion that the Treaty of Paris had ceded all Indian title to the United
States. The Indians and their British allies assumed that "[the Americans'] in-
tention was to exterminate the Indians and take the lands." 99
Yet in its waning days, the Continental Congress repudiated this approach,
declaring in the Northwest Ordinance that the Indians' "lands and property
shall never be taken from them without their consent.""' Knox and other
Washington Administration members endorsed this robust understanding of
Indian land ownership. Knox wrote Washington:
The Indians being the prior occupants possess the right of the Soil -It
cannot be taken from them unless by their free consent, or by the right
of Conquest in case of a just War-To dispossess them on any other
296. The literature on this topic is large. Key works include STUART BANNER, How THE INDIANS
LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER (2005); LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON,
CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCovERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
OF THEIR LANDS (2005); TAYLOR, supra note 1o2; BLAKE A. WATSON, BUYING AMERICA FROM
THE INDIANS:JOHNSON V. MCINTOSH AND THE HISTORY OF NATIVE LAND RIGHTS (2012); and
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DIs-
COURSES OF CONQUEST 227-317 (1990).
297. Stuart Banner distinguishes property from sovereignty, BANNER, supra note 296, at 6-9, but
does not address that contrast in discussing preemption, id. at 156-68.
298. The most influential such work was SAMUEL WHARTON, PLAIN FACTS: BEING AN EXAMINA-
TION INTO THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIAN NATIONS OF AMERICA, TO THEIR RESPECTIVE COuN-
TRIES (1781).
299. Notes of a Conversation with George Hammond, supra note 274, at 30.
300. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 34o (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936).
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principle would be a gross violation of the fundamental Laws of Nature
and of that destributive justice which is the glory of a nation.3"1
The Administration sought to put into practice what it preached. "You will
make it clearly understood," Knox instructed a commissioner to the Indians,
"that we want not a foot of their land, and that it is theirs, and theirs only; that
they have the right to sell, and the right to refuse to sell, and that the United
States will guaranty to them their said just right."302
Federal commissioners followed Knox's directions and walked back earlier
bluster. "We. . . frankly tell you, that we... put an erroneous construction on
that part of our treaty [of Paris] with the King [granting western lands]," they
informed members of the Northwest Indian Confederacy. "As [the King] had
not purchased the country of you, of course he could not give it away; he only
relinquished to the United States his claim to it."3"3 The commissioners then
repudiated the theory of conquest: "Brothers: We now concede this great
point. We, by the express authority of the President of the United States,
acknowledge the property, or right of soil, of the great country above de-
scribed, to be in the Indian nations, so long as they desire to occupy the
same."
304
Yet, as in the case of sovereignty, this defense of Native title came with an
important qualification. Although the Washington Administration regarded
Indian nations as the rightful owners of the land, they did not believe that In-
dian title was equivalent to fee simple absolute. In particular, Natives could not
freely alienate their land. Jefferson articulated the Administration's position
when pointedly asked by the British, "What did I understand to be our right
[as Americans] in the Indian soil?" 305 Jefferson responded: "[A] right of
preemption of their lands, that is to say the sole and exclusive right of purchas-
ing from them whenever they should be willing to sell. ",3 6
Preemption - the legal principle granting the government the sole authority
to purchase Native lands -had a lengthy history in North America. Through-
out the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, colonies had enacted laws and
301. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 267, at 491.
302. Instructions to Brigadier General Rufus Putnam (May 22, 1792), in I AMERICAN STATE PA-
PERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 234, 234.
303. Speech of the Commissioners of the United States to the Deputies of the Confederated Indi-
an Nations, in i AmEViCAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 352, 353.
304. Id. at 354.
305. Notes of a Conversation with George Hammond, supra note 274, at 30.
3o6. Id. Jefferson also mentioned the right to regulate commerce "between [Indians] and the
whites." Id.
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constitutional provisions restricting private purchases of Indian land.3"7 British
reforms after the Seven Years' War reserved the right of preemption to the
crown alone,3"' a legacy Congress had claimed, with mixed success, under the
Articles.3"9 To federal officials, preemption was one of the foundations of the
new national government's Indian policy.310 Federal officials insisted that the
Constitution granted the right of extinguishing Indian title to the federal gov-
ernment alone,31' and the first Trade and Intercourse Act barred the purchase
of Indian lands except at a public treaty held under federal authority. 12 The
Senate rejected one of the first Indian treaties negotiated under the Constitu-
tion for inadequately protecting federal preemption rights.313
The Washington Administration understood preemption in two ways. The
first was federalist: as enshrined in the Trade and Intercourse Act, preemption
was a sword against land-hungry states.31 4 The second was international:
preemption, by barring foreign purchases of Native lands, was a corollary of
the restriction on Native sovereignty placing Indian nations within the United
States under U.S. protection alone. In fact, to many federal officials, preemp-
tion was a restriction that applied to Europeans, not Indians; it was a prohibi-
tion that fell on "individual[s] of [other] nation[s]" who wished to purchase
Native land rather than on the Indian sellers. 315 "I consider[] our right of
307. See, e.g., 17 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DocuMENTs: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789: NEW
ENGLAND AND MIDDLE ATLANTIC LAWS 1607-1789, at 27, 81, 166, 220, 227, 235, 314, 318, 340,
393, 420, 423, 459, 473, 5oo, 631, 668, 678, 710, 733, 735, 755 (Alden T. Vaughan & Deborah A.
Rosen eds., 2004).
308. BANNER, supra note 296, at 85-95; Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial
Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69
B.U. L. REV. 329, 356-57 (1989).
309. Federal power of preemption appeared in Benjamin Franklin's first draft of the Articles, 2
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 198 (Worthington Chauncey Ford
ed., 19o5), but it was not included in the final draft. Madison believed the states retained the
right of preemption under the Articles, Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, supra
note 111, at 156, but elsewhere congressional delegates suggested that the federal govern-
ment possessed the power, 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 112, at
458.
31o. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 163, at 529, 534-35.
311. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington, supra note 267, at 524-25. In this let-
ter, Randolph listed three constitutional powers with respect to Indians: regulating com-
merce, making treaties, and protecting the right of preemption. Id. Randolph did not specify
the source of the preemption right.
312. Act of July 22, 1790, S 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138.
313. WATSON, supra note 296, at 170.
314. See supra Part II.C.i.
315. Notes of a Conversation with George Hammond, supra note 274, at 29-30.
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preemption of the Indian lands, not as amounting to any dominion, or juris-
diction, or paramountship whatever," Jefferson remarked, "but merely in the
nature of a remainder after the extinguishment of a present right, which gave
us no present right whatever but of preventing other nations from taking pos-
session and so defeating our expectancy."
316
This international focus explains federal officials' accounts of preemption's
origins. The Supreme Court, and much Indian law scholarship, has labeled Eu-
ropean assertions of control over Native lands as the "doctrine of discovery,"
under which "fee title to the lands occupied by Indians when the colonists ar-
rived became vested in the sovereign-first the discovering European nation
and later the original States and the United States."31 7 Many scholars have as-
cribed the plenary power's origins to this doctrine."" But, as historians have
come to recognize, this account of Anglo-Americans' historical land claims was
largely a fiction contrived by John Marshall." 9 Rights based on discovery was
one of multiple doctrines that operated to justify British possession of North
America, 320 yet discovery's legal status was dubious, rejected by the era's lead-
316. Notes on Cabinet Opinions, supra note 261, at 272.
317. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 n.i (2005) (quoting Cnty. of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985); Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indi-
an Nation, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974)). The most thorough account of the Doctrine of Dis-
covery's role in American history appears in ROBERT J. MILLER ET AL., DISCOVERING INDIGE-
NOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES 1-89 (2010). Miller
employs the term "Doctrine of Discovery" broadly, however, to include international law
doctrines - including possession, terra nullius, and conquest - that other scholars have treat-
ed as distinct. Id. at 6-8. For additional background, see WILLIAMs, supra note 296 (tracing
the Doctrine of Discovery's roots to medieval legal thought).
318. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 216, at 28-41; Frickey, supra note 13, at 55-60; Newton, supra
note 28, at 207-11; Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail
of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV.
219, 26o-65.
31g. See Andrew Fitzmaurice, Discovery, Conquest, and Occupation of Territory, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 840, 841 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne
Peters eds., 2012) ("The 'doctrine of discovery' may be a useful shorthand when applied to
the justifications of empire employed by States, but it is misleading if applied to the history
of the law of nations which has largely been opposed to the principle of discovery."); Lind-
say G. Robertson, John Marshall as Colonial Historian: Reconsidering the Origins of the Discov-
ery Doctrine, 13 J.L. & POL. 759, 766 (1997) ("The historical mandate on the strength of
which the Discovery Doctrine elucidated in Johnson v. M'Intosh was adopted into American
law was not clearly either historical or a mandate.").
320. This was an important question during pre-revolutionary debates over British authority. See
James Muldoon, Discovery, Grant, Charter, Conquest, or Purchase: John Adams on the Legal Ba-
sisfor English Possession of North America, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERIcA 25, 40-
41 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 2001); Anthony Pagden, Law, Coloniza-
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ing authorities on international law and easily mocked.321 In both international
law and American practice respecting Native lands, purchase and possession
played a far greater role than discovery and conquest.
31
The Washington Administration's assertion of a preemptive right in Native
lands, then, implied different conclusions, and relied on different sources, from
the Supreme Court's later holding in Johnson v. M'Intosh that Indians possessed
a right of occupancy only.32 3 Unlike Chief Justice Marshall, the Administration
disclaimed any notion that it possessed fee title to Native lands. Federal offi-
cials were also uninterested in the abstract search for origins that preoccupied
Marshall. 3 ' They instead grounded their preemptive right to Native lands as
they did their argument restricting Native rights to ally with foreign powers -
in treaties and customary international law. Jefferson described "the right of
pre-emption" as "a principle of the law of nations, fundamental with respect to
America." 325
tion, Legitimation, and the European Background, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
AMERICA 1, 29-31 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
321. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 319, at 842-44 (noting that Grotius rejected discovery outright,
while Vattel only "conceded a minor role for discovery" in establishing title as long as it was
followed by actual possession); Pagden, supra note 320, at 18 ("If sailing along a coast can
give a right to a country, then might the people ofJapan become, as soon as they please, the
proprietors of Britain.") (quoting RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIWIL
LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH
AMERICA 17 (9 th ed. 1776), reprinted in POLITICAL WRITINGS 20, 40 (D.O. Thomas ed.,
1991)).
322. Pagden, supra note 320, at 24-29; see also BANNER, supra note 296, at 11O-11 (discussing the
widespread practice of land purchases in early America); KEN MACMILLAN, SOVEREIGNTY
AND POSSESSION IN THE ENGLISH NEW WORLD: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE, 1576-
1640, at 179-207 (2006) (stressing the importance of Roman law concepts of prescription
and effective control in English claims to North American territory); CHRISTOPHER L. TOM-
LINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAw, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA,
158o-1865, at 133-90 (2010) (emphasizing the role of discourses of use and purchase in
claiming Native land); Fitzmaurice, supra note 319, at 841, 856 (tracing the "triumph of the
idea of occupation over its rivals discovery and conquest" in the history of international
law).
323. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587-88 (1823).
324. Of the members of the Washington Administration, only Jefferson offered, at one point, a
justification of preemption that traced to original settlement, sounding in the Doctrine of
Discovery. Jefferson, supra note 164, at 407. Jefferson's account diverged sharply from Mar-
shall's later version. Jefferson interpreted this history as grant "against all other nations ex-
cept the natives" and emphasized that Native title could be claimed only through war or pur-
chase. Id. (emphasis added).
325. Id.; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Knox (Aug. 26, 1790), in 17 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 430, 430-31 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1965) (describing preemption as "the
jus gentium established for America by universal usage").
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Negotiations with the Northwest Indian Confederacy provide the clearest
account of the administration's understanding of preemption's origins. En-
deavoring to explain preemption to Native envoys, the commissioners began
their account with prerevolutionary British practice. The King, they explained,
possessed a claim to Native territory, "founded on a right acquired by treaty,
with other white nations, to exclude them from purchasing, or settling, in any
part of your country. ",36 Under this principle, "the King alone had a right to
purchase of the Indian nations, any of the lands between the great lakes, the
Ohio, and the Mississippi." '327 Having established the basis for the British
claim, they continued:
[I]t is this right which the King granted to the United States... , by
the treaty of peace,... they alone have now the right of purchasing; so
that, now, neither the King, nor any of his people, have any right to in-
terfere with the United States, in respect to any part of those lands.32
8
Therefore, the commissioners emphasized, the United States disclaimed all
ownership of Native lands: "We only claim ... the general right granted by the
King, as above stated, and which is well known to the English and Americans,
and called the right of pre-emption, or the right of purchasing of the Indian
nations disposed to sell their lands, to the exclusion of all other white people
whatever." 329
In the eyes of federal officials, then, preemption was separate from the
question of Native land ownership. It was a problem of sovereignty-as much
European as Native - and its status as binding law rested on the positive law of
nations, particularly treaty law. Moreover, conceiving of preemption as a re-
striction on purchasers, not sellers, solved the problem of origins, since the Eu-
ropean nations had bargained away their rights to buy Indian lands through
formal treaties and enacted laws barring their subjects from purchasing Native
territory. 30
326. Speech of the Comm'rs of the U.S. to the Deputies of the Confederated Indian Nations, su-
pra note 303, at 353.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 353-54.
329. Id. at 354.
33o. Secretary of War Timothy Pickering outlined this view thoroughly in a letter to General An-
thony Wayne in preparation for the Treaty of Greenville. The Indians, he anticipated, would
ask, if the land was acknowledged to be theirs, "Why shall we not sell it to whom we
please?" He proposed an answer to Wayne:
The White Nations, in their treaties with one another, agree on certain bounda-
ries beyond which neither is to advance. [In] America where these boundaries
agreed on by the White people, pass along the countries of the Indians, the mean-
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Natives did not agree with the federal officials' construction. "You have
talked... a great deal about pre-emption, and your exclusive right to purchase
Indian lands, as ceded to you by the King, at the treaty of peace," the Native
leaders replied to the federal commissioners' attempt to justify the concept of
preemption.33' The Natives quickly pointed out the flaw in the officials' inter-
national law argument: the absence of Native consent. "We never made any
agreement with the King, nor with any other nation, that we would give to ei-
ther the exclusive right of purchasing our lands," they replied.332
If the white people, as you say, made a treaty that none of them but the
King should purchase of us, and that he has given that right to the
United States, it is an affair which concerns you and him, and not us:
we have never parted with such a power.33
For their part, the Natives declared to the commissioners, "[W] e consider our-
selves free to make any bargain or cession of lands, whenever and to whomso-
ever we please." 334
Native resistance to preemption puzzled federal officials, who thought they
were doing Native peoples a great favor by protecting their land rights. But
Natives understood the stakes: as modern scholarship has underscored,
preemption was a powerful tool in dispossessing Native peoples, forestalling
Native property innovations that preserved their independence. 3 ' Giving the
ing of the treaties is this, that one White Nation shall not purchase or [take] pos-
session of any Indians land beyond their boundary so agreed on even altho' the
Indians should [agree] to sell or give it to them .... For each white [n]ation
makes certain rules about Indian Lands which every one of the people is obliged
to follow the most important of these rules is that which forbids individuals [tak-
ing hold of] Indian lands without the consent of the Nation; when [indi]viduals
do such things, it is because they wish [to] cheat not only the Indians but their
own nation [w]hich therefore has a right to punish them & take away the lands so
unlawfully obtained. The United States have made such a rule the [de]sign of
which is to protect the Indian Lands [a]gainst such bad men.
Letter from Timothy Pickering to Anthony Wayne (Apr. 8, 1795), in Northwest Territory
Collection, M367, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Ind., http://images
.indianahistory.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/ONWT/id/1472/rec/2 [http://perma.cc
/KAB 7-ENUC].
331. Letter from Gen. Council of Indian Nations to the Comm'rs of the United States (Aug. 16,




335. See TAYLOR, supra note 102, at 404 (arguing that preemption should not be considered "any-
thing more than a partisan fiction asserted to dispossess native people" and noting that it
defeated Native efforts to retain authority by leasing lands "directly to individuals of their
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federal government sole power to purchase Indian lands made it increasingly
easy to describe Natives as federal "tenant[s]," as Edmund Randolph did, pre-
figuring the later concept that Natives only occupied, rather than owned, their
lands .1 6 The Indians' self-imagined benefactors again constructed law that
would eventually undermine Native independence.
4. The Doctrinal Origins ofPlenary Power
As previous sections have underscored, federal officials understood the sov-
ereignty they claimed over Native nations as modest. They saw no contradic-
tion in acknowledging Native sovereignty while asserting that ultimate sover-
eignty lay, for certain purposes, with the United States. Yet these purportedly
narrow restrictions sapped Native power and provided the seeds for the doc-
trine of plenary power. There is a clear intellectual lineage from these early as-
sertions to the Court's claims of absolute authority over Natives a century later.
The context of sovereignty in the late eighteenth century clarifies how early
Americans could regard Natives as simultaneously sovereign and subordinate.
The American Revolution began as a constitutional struggle over sovereignty,
as many Anglo-Americans rejected the Blackstonian position that the King-in-
Parliament possessed supreme authority within the British Empire. 37 Ameri-
can proposals to divide power led the British to accuse colonists of embracing
the "solecism" of "imperium in imperio" ;338 the British insisted that there could
be only one sovereign within a polity.
own choice"); Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expro-
priation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. lo65 (2000) (describing how federal
preemption rights ensured the efficient expropriation of Native lands); see also WILLIAMS,
supra note 296, at 280, 287-317 ("Seldom has the dynamic relationship between American
racism and the dominant racial caste's economic interests been so clearly revealed within the
normative fineries of American legal discursive practice . . . [as i]n the Revolutionary-era
debate on the status and rights of Indians in their lands.... "),
336. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington, supra note 267, at 524-26; see also
BANNER, supra note 296, at 163 ("When Indian land could be bought and sold with the In-
dians still on it, the Indians' right to the land started to feel, to the buyers and sellers, less
like fee simple ownership."). Banner traces the subsequent evolution of doctrine toward In-
dian occupancy rather than fee simple ownership. Id. at 150-90.
337. On the Revolution as constitutional struggle, see generally JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011); LACROIx, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORI-
GINS, supra note 23; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787, at 345-89 (1969); and Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Col-
onists, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157 (1976).
338. The use of "solecism" to dismiss the concept of "imperium in imperio" is discussed in LA-
CROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 23, at 226 n.12. See also Daniel J. Hulsebosch,
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The new nation grappled with refuting this fundamental principle of eight-
eenth-century political thought. One solution was that sovereignty derived
from the people at large.339 More concretely, the valorization of federalism itself
provided the solution. The new ideology, derived partly from the law of na-
tions," ° celebrated multiple and overlapping sources of authority that early
Americans described as "divided sovereignty. " "
Given this profusion of ideas, the concept that Native nations possessed ex-
tensive sovereignty within the sovereignty of the United States was not alien.
In fact, Native nations' position within the United States was conceived simi-
larly to federalism. The restrictions imposed on tribal sovereignty resembled
state limitations under the Constitution, which barred states from engaging in
diplomacy or splitting their territory without federal consent. 42 A similar pre-
sumption concerning enumerated powers also seemed to apply: both states
and tribes were free to exercise sovereign powers not granted to the United
States.43
Constitutionally, of course, states and tribes were not the same. But the key
difference was not the text of the Constitution, which addressed both state and
tribal sovereignty only obliquely? 44 Rather, the central contrast lay in consent,
Imperia in Imperio: The Multiple Constitutions of Empire in New York, 175o-1777, 16 LAw &
HIST. REV. 319 (1998).
339. See WOOD, supra note 337, at 374-89.
340. See LACRoIx, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 23, at 125-28. See generally HENDRICK-
SON, supra note 33 (describing the Constitution's origins as an experiment in international
cooperation).
34,. See LACROiX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 23, at 221 ("Between the middle decades
of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth century, federal thought was
transformed from a heterodox willingness to tolerate messy, multilayered government into
an affirmative belief that such multiplicity- untidy though it might be - could form the ba-
sis for a new species of union.") On divided sovereignty, see PowELL, supra note 196, at 23-
24. See also Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and Territorial Criminal Jurisdic-
tion, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 657 (2013) (arguing for translating concepts of divided sovereignty
from the state-federal context to Indian law).
342. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1o, para. i; art. IV, § 3.
343. Compare Report on Public Lands, Nov. 8, 1791, in 22 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 162, at 274, 285 (recording statement by Jefferson that "in respect to the internal
regulation of the Indians" the United States exercised only the "jurisdiction over them...
prohibiting them from allowing any person to inhabit their country" without a U.S. li-
cense), with Massachusetts Convention Debates, Jan. 23, 1788, in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1313, 1315 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Sala-
dino eds., 2000) (recording view of Federalist delegate that "Congress had no right to alter
the internal regulations of a state").
344. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.) ("To
the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown."). States'
primary protection in the text of the 1787 Constitution came through the "political safe-
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as the Supreme Court would later recognize." s Through ratification, state citi-
zens had, at least formally, ceded portions of state sovereignty to the United
States. Native nations never consented to their inclusion within the United
States.46 Nor could their customs evince acquiescence to the law of nations.
U.S. claims to sovereignty over tribes-purportedly based on international
law-rested ultimately on imposition, not acceptance.
Natives understood this flaw in American logic. As we have seen, Native
leaders rejected the limitations thrust upon them; they had not yielded any au-
thority, regardless of what Euro-American empires had agreed. Far from con-
ceding U.S. sovereignty over them or their lands, Native leaders insisted that
Native nations were the United States' equals in the community of nations.
"We are of the same opinion with the people of the United States," the Mo-
hawk leader Joseph Brandt informed a federal commissioner."4 "[Y]ou consid-
er yourselves as independent people; we, as the original inhabitants of this
country, and sovereigns of the soil, look upon ourselves as equally independ-
ent, and free as any other nation or nations. ' 8
Native nations' resistance stemmed from more than concern over their dig-
nity as equal sovereigns. Native power in this period stemmed from the ability
to engage in diplomacy with Euro-American nations, something the U.S. for-
mulation of sovereignty denied. As they had for over a century, tribes exploited
their strategically important location perched between competing empires to
protect their autonomy.349 This so-called playoff system -called the "great rul-
ing principle of modern Indian politics" by contemporaries 50 - thrust Indian
guards of federalism" - their inclusion within federal governance - as the subsequent adop-
tion of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments through that process underscored. See Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954) (arguing that the
U.S. Constitution protects state interests through the states' "crucial role in the selection
and the composition of national authority"). Native nations, placed outside the polity,
lacked similar protections.
34s. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (holding that the Constitution did not apply
to the Cherokee Nation as "the powers of local self government enjoyed by the Cherokee na-
tion existed prior to the Constitution").
346. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 55-57 (2o12).
347. Reply of the Six Nations to a Speech from Gen. Knox, U.S. Sec'y of War, Apr. 21, 1794, in i
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 481, 481.
348. Id. On "free and independent" as a term of art in the eighteenth-century law of nations, see
Bellia & Clark, supra note 33, at 754.
349. Merrell, supra note 236, at 202.
350. Daniel K. Richter & Troy L. Thompson, Severed Connections: American Indigenous Peoples and
the Atlantic World in an Era of Imperial Transformation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
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affairs into the center of American diplomacy, as Native nations used tacit Brit-
ish and Spanish support to check U.S. expansionism.3s' Native power also
came from Indians' acknowledged ownership of most land in the United
States.352 As long as Natives held title, the expectations of land speculators, set-
tlers, and state and federal governments anxious for income could not be real-
ized.353
The legal principles espoused by the United States therefore struck at the
fundamental sources of Native power. The waning of Native autonomy rested
on inequalities- military, demographic, diplomatic-but it was also a "con-
quest by law,"35 4 as Anglo-Americans sought to quash Natives' ability to play
empires against each other and to drive down the price of Native lands through
monopsony.
The watershed moment for Native peoples in the trans-Appalachian West
came when the United States triumphed over a British-supported coalition of
Indian nations during the War of 1812. This was a legal as well as a military
victory. Rejecting British efforts to write Native independence into the peace
treaty, 35 the United States enshrined the principle that American Indian na-
tions were lesser sovereigns solely under U.S. protection356 Under the postwar
legal framework, "the Indians possessed 'a qualified sovereignty only' [while]
'supreme sovereignty' belonged to the United States.""'
Native nations' position within the United States had shifted significantly,
therefore, by 1831, when the Supreme Court sought to clarify Natives' constitu-
tional status in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.318 The Court splintered over wheth-
er the Cherokee Nation was a "foreign nation" for purposes of Article III juris-
ATLANTIC WORLD: 1450-1850, at 5oo (Nicholas Canny & Philip Morgan eds., 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
3S1. Id.; see also Jeremy Adelman & Stephen Aron, From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-
States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History, 104 AM. HIST. REV. 814, 838
(1999).
352. Cf TAYLOR, supra note 102, at 397-407 (noting Native efforts to preserve autonomy through
property innovation and stressing the limits on Native power resulting from restrictions on
their land ownership).
353. BANNER, supra note 296, at 136-38.
354. This phrase comes from the title ofLindsay Robertson's work. ROBERTSON, supra note 296.
355. SADOSKY, supra note 33, at 200-05.
356. GOULD, supra note 33, at 205-06.
357. Id. Leonard Sadosky describes this as the ascendency of the "Jackson Doctrine," which
sought to deny Natives "independent and unfiltered communications with ... European
powers." SADOSKY, supra note 33, at 200. The end of the War of 1812, he observes, "marked
the removal of American Indian nations from contact with the Westphalian system." Id. at
204.
358. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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diction: Justices Baldwin and Johnson argued against Native sovereignty,359
while Justice Thompson, joined by Justice Story, insisted that Indian tribes
were separate, sovereign entities.36' All argued from historical practice -further
demonstrating the tensions within early Indian law.
Chief Justice Marshall split the difference. He conceded that the Cherokee
Nation constituted a separate state and had been so regarded by the United
States., 6' "[Y] et," Justice Marshall continued, "it may well be doubted whether
those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United
States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. ", 6 ' Their ter-
ritory, he observed, "is admitted to compose a part of the United States ....
[T]hey are considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the United
States."s6 3 Moreover, he explained:
They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by
ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion
of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form
a political connexion with them, would be considered by all as an inva-
sion of our territory, and an act of hostility.3
64
Chief Justice Marshall's ensuing declaration that Indian tribes were "do-
mestic dependent nations" therefore owed much to earlier thinking about Na-
tive sovereignty., 6s Like earlier federal officials, he interpreted U.S. claims to
territorial sovereignty, including the authority to control Native land sales and
alliances, to make Native nations less than fully sovereign members of the in-
ternational community- hence "domestic." But Justice Marshall put a new va-
lence on this status. Knox, Jefferson, and others had not interpreted the re-
strictions on Native sovereignty to imply subordination; they had in fact
stressed Natives' continued independence. Justice Marshall emphasized Native
dependence, casting Indian tribes as wards of their U.S. guardian, reliant on
their "great father," the President, for protection. 66 Justice Marshall's patron-
359. Id. at 20-31 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 49-50 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
36o. Id. at 52-54 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 16 (plurality opinion).
362. Id. at 17.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 17-18.
36s. Id. at 17; cf. Ian Hunter, Vattel in Revolutionary America: From the Rules of War to the Rule of
Law, in BETWEEN INDIGENOUS AND SETTLER GOvERNANCE 12 (Lisa Ford & Tim Rowse eds.,
2013) (linking Marshall's decisions to the international-legal thought of the 179os, but un-
persuasively arguing that the dispossession of Natives was construed as extralegal).
366. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
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izing description, questionable in the 1830s, was even less apt applied to the
powerful Native nations of the 1790s. The shifting balance of power gave a
new inflection and a broader reach to the "species of sovereignty" the United
States claimed over tribes.367
Cherokee Nation also extended the reach of the Washington Administra-
tion's principles. Jefferson, Justice Marshall, and others constructed Native na-
tions' constitutional status by expanding international-law principles to North
American practices. Their formulation of Native quasi-sovereignty, in turn, be-
came the foundation for a new generation of international-law scholarship
seeking to clarify indigenous peoples' legal status in colonial law. 368 Through
Justice Marshall, early American legal thought on Natives transmuted into the
nineteenth-century international law of empire.
A half century after Cherokee Nation, the Court decided United States v.
Kagama,369 where it enunciated congressional plenary power over Indians.
Though the tone and content of the two decisions are strikingly different, key
core principles persisted. In Kagama, the Court considered, and rejected, the
Indian Commerce Clause as the source of federal plenary power.37' That power
existed, the Court reasoned, because "these Indians are within the geographical
limits of the United States."37' "The soil and the people within these limits are
under the political control of the Government of the United States, or of the
States of the Union," the Court expounded.3" "There exist within the broad
domain of sovereignty but these two." 73 But the Court did not rest congres-
sional authority on territorial sovereignty alone. "These Indian tribes are the
wards of the nation," it reasoned, discussing Cherokee Nation.374 "From their
367. See supra text accompanying note 277.
368. See ANAYA, supra note 257, at 26 (noting the incorporation of Marshall's decisions into Henry
Wheaton's treatise Elements of International Law); BENTON, supra note 269, at 271-72 (noting
the application of Marshall's holdings to British India by Travers Twiss and other nine-
teenth-century international lawyers); cf FORD, supra note 198, at 24-26, 183-21o (situating
Cherokee Nation as part of a broader global "transformation of settler sovereignty" encom-
passing the United States, Canada, and Australia that she suggests began in Georgia); Linda
Colley,_Empires of Writing: Britain, America and Constitutions, 1776-1848, 32 L. & HIST. REv.
237, 256-63 (2014) (arguing for the role of written constitutions in British and American im-
perial projects to extend authority over Natives and other colonized peoples).
369. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
370. Id. at 378-79.
37"1. Id. at 379.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 383.
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very weakness and helplessness ...there arises the duty of protection, and
with it the power."
3 7
Kagama's endorsement of plenary power both fulfilled and repudiated orig-
inal understandings of Natives' constitutional status. Continuity rather than
innovation characterized the Court's reasoning, which relied on the same prin-
ciples- territorial sovereignty and the United States as protector- earlier ad-
vanced to justify American claims to authority over Native nations. Yet the
Court's decision employed these tenets to claim a far more sweeping authority
than previously asserted. Moving far beyond the earlier era's limited re-
strictions on Native sovereignty, the Court's bolder position claimed that Con-
gress could interfere with internal tribal affairs at will. Moreover, the Court's
reading of protection reversed the concept's earlier meaning. Crafted to prevent
Native alliances and forestall warfare, the principle of sole federal protection of
Indians originally stemmed from Native power, not weakness. But the Kagama
Court transformed this principle to argue that Indian incapacity justified feder-
al power. Finally, Kagama radically reworked the sources of federal power over
Native nations. In place of the international law principles that undergirded
earlier claims, the Court substituted the inherent prerogatives of sovereignty
common in late nineteenth-century jurisprudence. , 6
Over the course of a century, then, the sovereignty that the United States
claimed over Native nations grew ever greater, culminating in the doctrine of
plenary power. This trajectory owed much to the United States' military and
diplomatic conquest of the continent- a conquest that made Native sovereign-
ty seem a legal artifice rather than the palpable fact it had been when the Con-
stitution was drafted' 77 It stemmed, too, from the rise of a racialist paradigm
that denigrated Native peoples and their claims to nationhood. 7 Nineteenth-
century international law reflected this transformation: shedding its earlier
universalism, it became more positivist and more imperialist, crafting hierar-
37s. Id. at 384.
376. See Cleveland, supra note 216, at 7.
377. Sovereignty obviously remained a reality for the Native nations that continued to exercise it,
notwithstanding acknowledgment vel non by the United States.
378. For an introduction to the considerable literature on this topic, see REGINALD HORSMAN,
RAcE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERiCAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM 189-
207 (1981); RICHTER, supra note 86, at 189-236; Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the
American Indian, 56 UCLAL. REv. 591, 617-28 (2009); and Joshua Piker, Indians and Race in
Early America: A Review Essay, 3 HIST. COMPASS 1 (2005).
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chies among nations and requiring "civilization" as a precondition for sover-
eignty.379
But there is an internalist story for the development of plenary power as
well-that is, one grounded in the evolution of legal discourse itself. In this ac-
count, the first federal leaders' narrow claims of sovereignty over Native na-
tions became the doctrinal tools for ever more aggressive assertions of federal
authority to regulate Indians. This result was not what the doctrines' creators
had intended, but neither was it unforeseeable: as Native resistance under-
scored, earlier and more limited federal claims of authority over Native nations
rested on principles of dominance that could, and did, expand. Through this
process, Jefferson's insistence that the United States did not possess "any do-
minion, or jurisdiction, or paramountship whatever" over Indians transformed
into an assertion of complete and unfettered power.3s0
C. Implications
Little has changed in plenary power doctrine in the century since Kagama
was decided, except that as the racialized rhetoric and theories of unenumerat-
ed federal powers employed in Kagama fell out of favor in the late twentieth
century, the Court dragged in the Indian Commerce Clause post hoc to sanitize
the doctrine.31' The history presented here suggests a more accurate account of
plenary power's sources, one less reliant on an implausible reading of the Indi-
an Commerce Clause. This perspective also clarifies how "two largely incom-
patible and doubtful assumptions," in Justice Thomas's words- federal plena-
ry power and inherent tribal sovereignty -came to coexist in federal Indian
law.382 "In my view," Justice Thomas wrote, "the tribes either are or are not
separate sovereigns, and our federal Indian law cases untenably hold both posi-
379. The relationship between positivism, international law, and imperialism is explored in
ANGHIE, supra note 257; and Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonial-
ism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1999).
380. Notes on Cabinet Opinions, supra note 250, at 272.
381. This transformation in Supreme Court jurisprudence occurred relatively quickly. Compare
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) (describing plenary power as "based on...
the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status" as well as on Indians' status as "an uneducated,
helpless and dependent people" (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715
(1943), and citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886))), with Cotton Pe-
troleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (citing this same portion of Morton
for the proposition that "the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide
Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs"). For a description of
the constitutionalization of plenary power over Indian affairs, see Cleveland, supra note 216,
at 77-81.
382. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214-15 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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tions simultaneously."' 8' But this "untenabl[e]" approach reflects how early
federal officials thought about Native sovereignty: from the beginning, Ameri-
can policymakers conceived of Native nations as separate, but lesser, sover-
eigns. The incompatibility that Justice Thomas identifies stems not from the
doctrine itself, but from the attempt to reinterpret this historical legacy into
present-day jurisprudential categories. Though the Court has used Indian
law's "confusion" to impose coherence at Natives' expense, 38 4 the original un-
derstandings of Natives' status suggest consistency rather than contradiction.
Recovering the early constitutional history of Natives also helps to resolve a
central tension in Indian law scholarship as to whether the "Founders" perpet-
uated domination over Native peoples or enshrined Native nations as inde-
pendent sovereigns. The answer is both. Though the Constitution's drafters
and early interpreters regarded most tribes as separate sovereigns largely out-
side U.S. authority, and many used federal power to protect Native rights, in
the end the legal order they constructed was imposed on Native nations with-
out their consent-indeed, over their vigorous objection. As Natives pointed
out, early Americans' construction of the community of nations did not
acknowledge Native nations as the United States' equals. The "Founders"
thereby placed the United States on the ideological road to the doctrine of ple-
nary power and the denial of Native sovereignty.
The history presented in this Article thus questions a now commonplace
scholarly assertion-that powers derived from sovereignty are a late nine-
teenth-century gloss inconsistent with the Constitution's original understand-
ing.3" s This declension model is, in part, an effort to maintain a "pure" Consti-
tution, untainted by later unpalatable applications. 38 6 This Article suggests that
constitutional law's subsequent nationalism, racism, and imperialism were all
present at the creation.
383. Id. at 215.
384. Id. at 223. For works criticizing the Court's efforts to craft coherence, see Philip P. Frickey,
(Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARv. L. REv. 431 (2005); and
David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme
Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. Rav. 1573 (1996).
385. This is the central argument in Cleveland, supra note 216. See also William Baude, Rethinking
the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 18oo-o5 (2013) (suggesting that pow-
ers inherent in sovereignty "ha[ve] very little support in the text, structure, or early history
of the Constitution" and are "a creature of a late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
jurisprudential trend").
386. Mark Graber has made a similar argument concerning interpretations of Dred Scott. Mark A.
Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14
CONST. COMMENT. 271 (1997).
1o83
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Nonetheless, the authority that the United States originally claimed over
Indian tribes was importantly different from later, more aggressive invocations
of federal power. It was not plenary; it acknowledged tribal sovereignty and re-
stricted the authority of the United States to the regulation of Natives' interna-
tional alliances and land sales. Furthermore, this authority's origins in the law
of nations suggested substantial checks based on treaty and customary law.
These aspects of original understandings bolster present-day calls for limits on
federal power over Natives as well as arguments that evolving international-
law norms should govern federal Indian law.8 Unbridled, unchecked federal
power over Indians has not always been with us.
More broadly, the history presented here suggests a different approach to
the question of Native sovereignty in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The privi-
leged position of Chief Justice Marshall's decisions in Indian law's constitu-
tional history has led some Justices to conclude that tribal sovereignty is the
Court's creation, thereby justifying the Court's aggressive crafting of doctrine
construing the scope of tribal sovereignty. 3ss Recognizing the centrality of the
executive in the historical decision to acknowledge and protect tribal sovereign-
ty, however, points toward a more modest judicial role in the present, with
greater deference to the political branches. 3 9
History also suggests a constructive comparison between tribal and state
sovereignty. The Constitution does not enshrine Native sovereignty, but unlike
the Articles of Confederation,39" it contains no textual provision explicitly codi-
fying state sovereignty either.3 9' Instead, the constellation of legal thought la-
beled "Our Federalism" rests largely on a structural reading of the Constitution
and its values, even as support for state sovereignty-like protection for tribal
387. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 13, at 74-94 (arguing for applying international law limitations
to federal power over Indians); Newton, supra note 28, at 237-47 (arguing for heightened
scrutiny for congressional restrictions on tribal sovereignty); Williams, supra note 318, at
293-99 (urging the abandonment of the "guardianship responsibility by which individual
European colonizers arrogated to themselves an unquestioned authority over Indian Na-
tions").
388. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 55-56, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.
Ct. 2024 (No. 12-515) (2014).
389. Cf. Michalyn Steele, Comparative Institutional Competency and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 8s
U. COLO. L. REV. 759, 780-815 (2014) (arguing that the Court should defer to Congress on
questions of tribal sovereignty based on an analogy from the Court's treatment of state sov-
ereignty).
390. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. I.
391. Though I refer here primarily to the 1787 Constitution, the Tenth Amendment does not al-
ter this conclusion: to the extent the Amendment codifies a concept of state sovereignty, it
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sovereignty-has waxed and waned.392 As this Article has shown, the Constitu-
tion's drafters and early interpreters thought about Natives' status in a similar
way- as the product of deep questions of constitutional order such as territori-
al jurisdiction and international law.
The point is not that tribes and states are constitutionally equivalent,
though the analogy has yielded important insights.393 Rather, I make the more
modest claim that the Court should be more attentive to the parallels in history
and values than it has been. As sovereigns, states possess what the Court has
termed "dignity";394 they also enjoy the Court's embrace of jurisdictional plu-
ralism recognizing the benefits of state divergence from national norms. But
the Supreme Court has never referred to the dignity of a tribal sovereign in a
majority opinion,39 and it views Native nations' nonconformity with skepti-
cism.
396
The doctrinal consequences of these contrasting narratives are apparent.
The Court has recently and repeatedly defended state sovereignty based not on
392. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971). This initial articulation of the principle in-
voked no specific text but instead "the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitu-
tion into existence," arguing that "this slogan, 'Our Federalism,' born in the early struggling
days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and
its future." Id.
393. See, e.g., Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between
the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L.
REv. 617 (1994) ("[T]he forces behind Union/state federalism, which invoke republican
democracy and ensure a role for states, have to a certain extent guided and should continue
to guide the Union/tribe relationship."); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes,
States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 671, 701 (1989) (noting that "there is much
to learn from thinking about both the differences and the similarities" between tribes and
states).
394. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999).
395. Justice Ginsburg has twice referred to tribal dignity in her dissents, see Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 347 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95,
121 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), while Justice Sotomayor suggested the parallels be-
tween the dignity of tribal and state sovereigns in a recent concurrence, Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2042 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Cf Judith
Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Concep-
tions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003) (exploring the rise of concepts of dignity in
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and arguing it has relevance with respect to tribes).
396. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Col-
or-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REy. 267, 345-48 (2001); cf. Wenona T.
Singel, The First Federalists, 62 DRAKE L. REv. 775, 837-42 (2013) (recounting the benefits of
innovations in tribal governance). See generally Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Il-
liberalism, 95 CAL. L. REv. 799 (2007) (describing judicial and scholarly hostility to exercises
of tribal sovereignty that diverge from liberal norms).
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constitutional text but "in light of [the Constitution's] history and struc-
ture."397 For Indian tribes, this argument is reversed: any "exercise of tribal
power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes and
cannot survive without express congressional delegation.",, 8 Under this im-
plicit divestiture doctrine, the Court has concocted all manner of restrictions on
Native sovereignty, 99 grounded not in text but in problematic readings of his-
tory.40
0
397. Alden, 527 U.S. at 724; see also, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689-92 (2013)
(questioning the Defense of Marriage Act for departing from the constitutional "history and
tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage"); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612, 2623-24 (2013) (invalidating a portion of the Voting Rights Act for violating the "fun-
damental principle of equal sovereignty among the States" (internal quotations and citations
omitted)); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602-03 (2012) (limiting
congressional power to condition grants to states under the Spending Clause because
"[o]therwise the two-government system established by the Framers would give way to a
system that vests power in one central government"); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
9o6-12 (1997) (holding that, although "there is no constitutional text speaking to this pre-
cise question," the federal government may not "commandeer" state officials based on "his-
torical understanding and practice,... the structure of the Constitution, and ... the juris-
prudence of this Court").
398. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
399. These have included restrictions on criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and nonmember
Indians, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685-86 (199o); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 209-10 (1978); on civil adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers within the
reservation, both on and off tribal land, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cat-
tle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
520 U.S. 438 (1997); Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-66; and on legislative jurisdiction, including
taxation, over nonmembers within the reservation, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645 (2001).
4oo. The Court's only serious consideration of the history of Native jurisdiction came in Oli-
phant, where it outlined nineteenth-century restrictions on tribal criminal jurisdiction. But
the only provision the Court cited predating the era of Indian removal was Justice Johnson's
opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, prefiguring his later concurrence in Cherokee Nation denying Na-
tive sovereignty altogether. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209 (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, lo U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 147 (181o) (Johnson, J., concurring)). Justice Johnson's idiosyncratic opinion
from two decades earlier is a poor interpretive guide for Chief Justice Marshall's holding. It
also ignores historical evidence suggesting that the federal government not only permitted,
but oversaw, tribal court jurisdiction exercising tribal sovereignty over non-Natives. See
FORD, supra note 198, at 60-63.
In Lara, both the majority and Justice Thomas emphasized the 1871 congressional act
that terminated treaty making with tribes. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201
(2004) ("We recognize that in 1871 Congress ended the practice of entering into treaties
with the Indian tribes."); id. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I would ascribe much more
significance to legislation such as the Act ... that purports to terminate the practice of deal-
ing with Indian tribes by treaty"). Though the Act's historical significance is considerable -
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The basis for this divergent treatment of state and tribal sovereignty seems
to be tribes' status as "dependent" sovereigns." ° Setting aside the question of
why states' explicit surrender of some sovereignty does not make them similar-
ly "dependent,"4" 2 the Court's interpretation of Native nations' dependency is
historically unsound. Chief Justice Marshall's classification of Indian tribes was
not an open-ended invitation to craft restrictions on Native authority but a ju-
dicial endorsement of the Washington Administration's interpretation of Na-
tives as unequal but sovereign nations. In light of that history, a better reading
of Marshall's holding would be that like states, Native nations possess "residu-
ary and inviolable sovereignty" outside the restrictions claimed by the United
States.403
Delineating the precise bounds of that sovereignty has proven, and will
likely prove, as elusive as it has in the federalism context. But a helpful starting
point would be to move away from claims that tribes are sovereigns by histori-
cal accident, existing only at the caprice of the national government. 4 4 The
recognition of Native sovereignty in early American law reflected the reality of
Native nations' independence and power, but it was also the product of consid-
ered deliberation and experimentation that mirrored the era's intellectual fer-
ment around federalism. The Washington Administration determined that ac-
knowledging Native sovereignty was not merely more expedient; it was also, as
the Administration repeatedly pointed out, more just.4 °"
"Constitutional" is a word with many meanings in American law. Its most
familiar doctrinal use is to describe limits on the federal government that may
symbolizing the shift to governing Indian affairs through legislation rather than diplomacy
and, relatedly, through the executive rather than Congress -doctrinally such an ordinary
statute, let alone one that is "constitutionally suspect," Lara, 541 U.S. at 218 (Thomas, J.,
concurring), does not deserve such weight. Even if it reflects a late nineteenth-century
judgment "that the tribes had become a purely domestic matter," id., that policy assessment
is not constitutional law, and the political branches' more recent determination that the
tribes possess inherent sovereignty- including in the statute at issue in Lara- seems more
relevant.
401. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within Our Federalism: Be-
yond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REv. 667, 667-68 (2006) (arguing that the im-
plicit divestiture doctrine is based on the presumption of tribal dependency).
402. Judith Resnik convincingly suggests that tribes, states, and the federal government are "in-
ter-dependent sovereigns." Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts: Applying the
Myths and the Methods ofMarbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts' Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARiz.
ST. L.J. 77, 134 (2004).
403. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 242 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
404. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("The sovereignty that the Indian
tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress
and is subject to complete defeasance.").
4os. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 241,259, 301-302.
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not be altered absent amendment. Despite the Court's efforts, sovereignty-
both state and tribal-has fit poorly, and unpredictably, into this frame.406
Though the history presented here supports expanded Native autonomy, argu-
ably too much has changed for the Court to enshrine as doctrine the Washing-
ton Administration's understanding of Native status, any more than the Court
can now reconstruct the federalism of the 1790s. But the term "constitutional"
plays another role for the Court: it determines which claims about the past will
receive acknowledgment and legal recognition in the present.40 7 This Article
suggests that, like the Court's endorsement of the diminished yet enduring
sovereignty of the states, tribal sovereignty warrants respect on the basis of the
Constitution's original "history and structure. " '4s In this sense, Native sover-
eignty is, and should remain, constitutional.
CONCLUSION
When we look beyond the Indian Commerce Clause-a minor and open-
ended part of constitutional thinking about Indian affairs -the Constitution's
"original understanding" becomes clearer. Under the Washington Administra-
tion, exclusive federal power was understood to derive from the entire Consti-
tution, while the limited sovereignty that the United States claimed over Na-
tive nations stemmed from the law of nations. Yet subsequently, even as the
federal government asserted more power over Natives, the basis for federal au-
thority narrowed to the single constitutional provision that explicitly men-
tioned Indians. The mismatch between the Clause's text and the federal gov-
ernment's sweeping power has led to calls to revisit federal Indian law, often at
tribes' expense. These claims rest on inaccurate history. Indian law is not inco-
herent; it is the product of constitutional thought that has been forgotten.
Consistent is not the same as correct. From the perspective of Native peo-
ples, federal Indian law remains doctrine imposed by a non-Native legal sys-
4o6. On state sovereignty, see Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence
of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 341, 346, which states that "[t]he rhetoric of
state sovereignty is responsible for much of the intellectual poverty of our federalism-related
jurisprudence." On tribal sovereignty, compare United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205
(2004), which argues that earlier cases "make clear that the Constitution does not dictate the
metes and bounds of tribal autonomy," with id. at 228 (Souter, J., dissenting), which argues
that "our previous understanding of the jurisdictional implications of dependent sovereignty
was constitutional in nature."
407. This is clearest in the Court's jurisprudence on determining which rights are "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. no, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (parsing how to
identify such "deeply rooted" rights).
4o8. See supra text accompanying note 397.
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tem-the self-proclaimed "Courts of the conqueror"4 °9-on Native nations
unwillingly and forcefully incorporated into the United States. A better grasp
of the Constitution's "original understanding" cannot solve this ongoing chal-
lenge of Indian law's imperial origins."0 The late eighteenth century was an
important watershed in the waning of Native autonomy, and early federal offi-
cials laid the groundwork for later claims of unbridled power over Native na-
tions. For this reason, some have argued for abandoning Anglo-American law
altogether and turning to indigenous legal concepts to redeem Indian law.41'
But these deep questions about federal Indian law do not preclude also im-
proving current doctrine by revisiting first principles.42 History can help here.
The 178os and '9os are central to understanding Indian law not because consti-
tutional meaning was fixed at that moment, but because the process of creating
the "United States" occurred in dialogue with other nations, including Native
nations. In short, wrestling with the sovereignty and nationhood of the United
States also required grappling with that of Native nations; the answers pro-
posed for both sets of questions proved long-standing and influential.
Late eighteenth-century views warrant continued attention on another ba-
sis, as well. Current law lacks the acute consciousness, widespread among the
era's legal elite, that the treatment of Native peoples was an essential compo-
nent of the national character. The "Founders" felt this way not because they
were moral exemplars, but because they lived in a world where relations with
Native peoples could not be shunted aside as a minor administrative matter,
and because their near-millenarian understanding of the United States' role
blended with a sharp sense of international scrutiny and judgment. They thus
409. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823). See generally WALTER R. ECHO-
HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DE-
CIDED (2010).
41o. See Frickey, supra note 384, at 487 (arguing that the core tension in federal Indian law is the
"fundamental normative confusion" about "our creation of a constitutional democracy
through colonialism."); Resnik, supra note 393, at 697 ("No act of interpretation and no
elaboration of consent theory can explain federal exercise of power and dominion over Indi-
an tribes.").
411. For an argument for alternative legal visions rooted in indigenous norms, see ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND
PEACE, 16oo-i8oo, at 3-12 (1997); and Williams, supra note 318, at 289-99. Notably, Wil-
liams bases his account in history.
412. The possibility of redemption within current law was the subject of a prominent debate in
federal Indian law scholarship. See Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power
of Congress over the Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams' Algebra, 30
ARiz. L. REv. 413 (1988); Robert A. Williams, Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A
Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian
Nations, 30 Aiz. L. REv. 439 (1988). On constitutional redemption more broadly, see J. M.
BALKIN, CONSTITrUTIONA REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011).
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resolved to treat Natives based on "laws founded in justice and humanity."4 13
From the perspective of Native peoples, and in the judgment of history, these
efforts failed. Yet in the process, notwithstanding their commitment to Ameri-
can empire and racialist disdain for Indians, early American leaders defied
popular prejudice and crafted doctrine that granted considerable space for Na-
tive autonomy, a tradition that federal Indian law in its finer moments contin-
ues to uphold.
Yet it was not early American officials alone who shaped the constitutional
law of Indian affairs. Native voices rarely appear in Indian law, based on the
presumption that they did not craft the law that applied to them. But as this
Article has suggested,414 the grudging acknowledgment of Native autonomy in
early American law stemmed from tribes' refusal to concede the subordinate
status that Anglo-Americans assigned to them. Though Chief Justice Marshall
later cast Natives as legal na'fs,41s Native leaders proved as adept as Anglo-
Americans at using the resources of international law to assert themselves as
"free and independent" nations." 6 These arguments often failed in the face of
unequal power, but they forced the United States to grapple with deep ques-
tions of justice in Indian policy. Ultimately, Natives were subject to a history
and a doctrine not of their choosing, yet they were, and remain, constitutional
actors in their own right.
413. The quotation is from the Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).
414. This Article has only briefly introduced the depth of Native engagement with international
law created in an Anglo-American and European context, a topic I explore more fully else-
where. See Gregory Ablavsky, Species of Sovereignty: Native-Claims Making and the Early
American State (Oct. 10, 2014) (unpublished conference paper) (on file with author).
415. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831).
416. Scholarship has stressed the importance of Native legal activism in shaping Indian policy,
but has focused on the twentieth century. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN W. MCMRLEN, MAKING IN-
DIAN LAW: THE HutALAA LAND CASE AND THE BIRTH OF ETHNOHISTORY (2007); DAViD E.
WILKINS, HoLLow JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF INDIGENOUS CLAIMS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2013); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS
(2005). For consideration of Natives as legal actors in the early modem period, see NATIVE
CLAIMS: INDIGENOUS LAW AGAINST EMPIRE, 15OO-1920 (Saliha Belmessous ed., 2012); and
WILLIAMS, supra note 411.
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